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On January 17, 2010, in West Haven, Connecticut, Selami 
Ozdemir murdered his wife, Shengyl Rasim, in front of their two 
children.1 Ozdemir then used the same gun to take his own life.2 
Although undoubtedly a tragedy in its own right, the devastation 
of this murder-suicide is compounded by the larger failure of 
the criminal justice system in preventing these and similar 
deaths from ever occurring.3 
This was not the first time that Ozdemir’s violent behavior 
had been brought to the attention of the Connecticut criminal 
justice system.4 In September 2009, the police were called to 
                                                                                                                            
1. See Arielle Levin Becker, Should Abusers Get a Second Chance?; Handling of 
Offenders at Issue After Killings, HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting the 
murder of twenty-five year old Shengyl Rasim by her husband, Selami Ozdemir); see also 
Rob Varnon, Man Kills Wife, Self After Posting Bond, GREENWICH TIME, Jan. 17, 2010, 
available at 2010 WL 1055350 (detailing the domestic-violence- related murder of Rasim 
by her spouse, Ozdemir, following his release from police custody for a separate 
domestic-violence-related incident). 
2. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (noting that Ozdemir took his own life after 
murdering his wife Rasim); see also Amanda Pinto & James Tinley, West Haven Officials 
Mum on Murder, Suicide Report: Domestic Violence Mishandled at Every Level, NEW HAVEN 
REG., May 26, 2010, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/05/26/news/metro/
doc4bfc95e57b5e9278986614.txt (describing how the criminal justice system failed to 
prevent the murder of Rasim and suicide of Ozdemir). 
3. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that Ozdemir’s sentence requiring his 
attendance at a batterer’s treatment program equated to a second chance that allowed 
him to murder his wife and take his own life); see also Pinto & Tinley, supra note 2 
(recognizing that the criminal justice system had mishandled Ozdemir’s repeated acts 
of violence towards his wife). 
4. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (stating that Ozdemir had previously been 
brought to the attention of Connecticut police for domestic violence); see also James 
Tinley, Key Breakdowns Led to Murder-Suicide, NEW HAVEN REG., May 25, 2010, 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/05/25/news/metro/doc4bfb26c22e0e5880
064660.txt (noting that although Ozdemir had previously been called to the attention 
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Ozdemir’s house where they found Rasim lying beaten against 
the crib where their three-month-old daughter slept.5 Rasim’s 
mouth was bloodied and her cheek welted.6 Ozdemir was 
arrested and, as part of his sentence, was ordered to attend a 
family violence education program.7 Throughout the world, 
family violence education programs, also referred to as batterer 
intervention programs, vary in the way they are structured or 
implemented; however, one common feature of these programs 
is that they are typically offered as a sentencing alternative to 
incarceration for domestic violence offenders.8 Generally, they 
seek to reform batterer behavior through psycho-education, 
cognitive-behavioral intervention, couples counseling, or an 
assessment of individual needs and batterer typology.9 
Although Ozdemir was sentenced to participate in one of 
these programs in November 2009, he never attended.10 Due to 
a backlog created by a lack of funding and resources, Ozdemir 
                                                                                                                            
of the police for abusing his wife, police were still unable to provide her protection 
from subsequent abuse). 
5. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (describing a previous domestic attack, which 
had been brought to the attention of the Connecticut police); see also Tinley, supra note 
4 (showing that the police and courts were aware of Ozdemir’s history of domestic 
violence and highlighting his ability to post bond after assaulting Rasim on April 16, 
2010, even after he was first arrested for beating his wife in September 2009). 
6. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (detailing the injuries sustained by Rasim from 
her husband Ozdemir after an attack); see also Tinley, supra note 4 (noting that Rasim 
was abused in September 2009 by her spouse Ozdemir). 
7. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that Ozdemir was sentenced to a 
batterer’s intervention program in Connecticut, the Family Violence Education 
Program). Connecticut’s Family Violence Education Program is an example of just one 
of the many batterer intervention programs employed by court systems all over the 
world. See Batterers’ Intervention Programs, ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., http://stopvaw.org/
Batterers_Intervention_Programs.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinafter 
STOPVAW] (providing a brief explanation of batterer intervention programs and their 
use throughout the United States, as well as in other countries such as Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Georgia). 
8. See NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 195079, BATTERER 
INTERVENTION PROGRAMS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?, at iii, 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS] (proffering a general description of intervention 
programs). 
9. See id. at 1–2. 
10. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that Ozdemir never attended a 
batterer intervention program because his attendance was delayed by a shortage of 
spots); see also Tinley, supra note 4 (stating that Ozdemir did not attend the batterer 
intervention program he was sentenced to in the months prior to murdering his wife). 
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was not scheduled to begin the program until February 2010, 
one month after he murdered Rasim and took his own life.11 
In the same jurisdiction the year before, Jose Lacouture 
also murdered his wife.12 Unlike Ozdemir, however, at the time 
of the murder, Lacouture had already completed a batterer 
intervention program in Rhode Island, and was currently 
enrolled in a related program in Connecticut.13 
Unfortunately, these examples are not anomalies.14 
Montgomery County, Ohio recently released a review of the 
domestic violence fatalities in the county from 1995–2009.15 In 
twenty-two percent of the domestic-violence-related deaths in 
which there had been a documented history of domestic 
violence, the perpetrator had previously been ordered to attend 
a batterer intervention program.16  
                                                                                                                            
11. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that Ozdemir’s attendance at the 
batterer treatment program was delayed); see also Pinto & Tinley, supra note 2 
(explaining the effects of funding shortages on batterer intervention programs). 
12. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (describing how Jose Lacouture murdered his 
wife following repeated incidents of domestic violence); see also David Owens, Suspect: ‘I 
Killed My Wife’; Victim Had Protective Order Against Husband Accused in Her Slaying, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 18, 2009, at A1 (stating that Lacouture murdered his wife 
after having been brought to the attention of the court system for abuse on numerous 
occasions). 
13. See Becker, supra note 1, at A1 (noting that Lacouture had admitted to 
previously attending a batterer intervention program in Rhode Island before receiving 
a new sentence to a different batterer intervention program in Connecticut). 
14. See infra notes 147–57 and accompanying text (providing further evidence of 
the ineffectiveness of batterer intervention programs); see also NAT’L OFFENDER MGMT. 
SERV., MINISTRY OF JUST., WHAT WORKS WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS? (2010) 
(U.K.), available at http://www.rapt.org.uk/core/core_picker/download.asp?id=
215&filetitle=NOMS+study+-+domestic+violence+offenders [hereinafter MINISTRY OF 
JUST., WHAT WORKS WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS?] (“The results of a 2009 
review of seven [domestic violence] perpetrator treatment studies suggested that 
perpetrator interventions have limited effect on repeat violence, with most studies 
demonstrating minimal or no benefit above the no-treatment control group. Overall, 
approximately one in three cases, regardless of intervention, had a new episode of 
[domestic violence] within 6 months, according to victim reports.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
15. MONTGOMERY CNTY. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEATH REVIEW COMM., REPORT NO. 
6, DATA SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available at 
http://www.mcohio.org/ Montgomery/home/docs/Domestic_Violence_Death_
Review_Report.pdf. 
16. See id. at 29 (stating that of the thirty-six cases in which there was a 
documented history of domestic violence, eight perpetrators had been ordered into 
batterer intervention programs). Almost seventeen percent of the total fatalities were 
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Discouraging cases and statistics like these exist even 
though the United States was one of the earliest countries to 
implement the use of batterer intervention programs, which 
have been used in localities throughout the country for 
decades.17 Despite setbacks in the United States, a country 
considered to be at the forefront of domestic violence 
awareness, international governmental bodies and national 
governments throughout the world increasingly promulgate 
public policies that advocate for the use of batterer intervention 
programs.18 These continued policy endorsements reflect the 
optimism of the programs’ proponents who point to successful 
cases and the benefits of abuser rehabilitation to justify a 
widespread use of such programs.19 Given the evidence to the 
contrary, a debate has emerged as to whether batterer 
intervention programs are sound policy.20 Adding to this debate 
is the complicating factor that the success of batterer 
intervention programs hinges on the manner and thoroughness 
of their implementation on the ground level in coordination 
with community and criminal justice services.21 
                                                                                                                            
committed by perpetrators who had fully completed a batterer intervention program. 
See id. 
17. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that the 
first batterer intervention program models were psycho-educational programs that are 
now referred to as the Duluth model); see, e.g., id. (reporting results of batterer 
intervention programs in Brooklyn, New York and Broward County, Florida); 
STOPVAW, supra note 7 (noting, as one example, the use of batterer intervention 
programs in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). 
18. The United Nations (“UN”) and Council of Europe (“COE”) have both 
encouraged member states to employ the use of batterer intervention programs. See 
infra Part I.C. These endorsements, in addition to the widespread use and emergence 
of batterer intervention programs in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(“UK”), have led to many countries around the world adopting similar policies. See 
infra Part I.C–D. This Note discusses the policies of Brazil, the COE, India, England, 
the UN, and the United States. See infra Part I.C–D. Other countries, however, also 
utilize batterer intervention programs, such as: Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, 
Chile, Cyprus, Iceland, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Russian Federation, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. See U.N. Secretary-
General, Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women, ¶ 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/65/208 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
19. See infra notes 136–46 and accompanying text (relaying the position of 
supporters in favor of using batterer intervention programs in court sentencing). 
20. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing the arguments both for and against batterer 
intervention programs). 
21. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (discussing increased success 
with batterer intervention programs when used in conjunction with coordinated 
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In its exploration of batterer intervention programs as a 
sentencing option, this Note analyzes whether it is appropriate 
for international and national governmental bodies to advocate 
for their implementation. Part I discusses the historical 
antecedents of the movement to end domestic violence, 
including the rise of batterer intervention programs as a 
sentencing option. It next details the promotion of batterer 
intervention programs by the United Nations (“UN”) and the 
Council of Europe (“COE”) to their member states, and finally 
the policies implemented domestically by Brazil, England, India, 
and the United States.22 Part II reviews studies and reports and 
discusses the arguments for and against batterer intervention 
programs. Part II also presents problems and complications in a 
top-down approach to the implementation of batterer 
intervention programs when the burden and effort of these 
programs is a function of local government. Lastly, Part III 
concludes that while local governments responsible for 
implementing sentencing policy may decide that batterer 
intervention programs are appropriate for their jurisdiction, 
supranational and national governmental bodies should refrain 
from advocating or endorsing such policy. 
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES 
The effective response of the criminal justice system to 
domestic violence has become increasingly important because of 
the continued prevalence of such violence.23 Therefore, a broad 
and global overview of criminal justice systems, and their 
response to such incidents, is necessary to understand the 
impact of and need for batterer intervention programs. It is also 
important to understand how criminal justice systems have 
                                                                                                                            
community responses); see also infra Part II.C (discussing the challenges in 
implementing problem-solving justice initiatives from the top down). 
22. The selection of these countries is reflective of the author’s intent to represent 
a range of policies from countries that are culturally and geographically diverse. These 
countries also differ significantly in the relative age of their domestic violence laws and 
the sentencing practices adopted in their justice systems. See infra Part I.D. The 
inclusion of these countries is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list of national 
policies concerning batterer intervention programs. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra 
note 18, ¶ 23 (listing the growing number of states that have implemented batterer 
intervention programs). 
23. See infra notes 28, 91, 102, 115, 125 and accompanying text. 
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responded to domestic violence both over time and across the 
globe. This Part examines the characteristics of domestic 
violence and the factors that initially gave rise to the use of 
batterer intervention programs as a sentencing option. 
Specifically, Section A describes domestic violence and its effects 
on victims and society as a whole, while Section B discusses the 
historic origins of the movement to end domestic violence and 
its development, leading to the rise of batterer intervention 
programs as a sentencing option. Next, Section C provides 
background on the endorsement of batterer intervention 
programs by international governing bodies, which in turn has 
provided credibility to national domestic programs. Finally, 
Section D compares the approaches of various national domestic 
policies to batterer intervention programs, beginning with the 
United States and England and followed by a comparison of 
Brazil and India. 
A. What is Domestic Violence? 
While there are a number of criminal acts that can lead a 
court to sentence an offender to a batterer intervention 
program, collectively, these offenses fall into the catchall 
category of “domestic violence.”24 For the purposes of this Note, 
domestic violence is defined as “a pattern of assaultive and 
coercive behaviors, including physical, sexual, and psychological 
attacks, as well as economic coercion, that adults or adolescents 
use against their intimate partners.”25 
                                                                                                                            
24. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES: DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 3 (2006) (U.K.) (“There is no specific offence [sic] 
of domestic violence and conduct amounting to domestic violence is covered by a 
number of statutory provisions.”); see also SUMAN KAKAR, DOMESTIC ABUSE: PUBLIC 
POLICY/CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACHES TOWARDS CHILD, SPOUSAL AND ELDERLY ABUSE 
44–47 (1997) (describing the many manifestations and forms of domestic violence). 
25. Anne L. Ganley, Understanding Domestic Violence, in IMPROVING THE HEALTH 
CARE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS 15, 16 (1998) (providing a definition of domestic violence); see also KERRY 
HEALEY, CHRISTINE SMITH & CHRIS O’SULLIVAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. NCJ 168638, BATTERER INTERVENTION: PROGRAM APPROACHES AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STRATEGIES 3 (1998) (citing Anne Ganley’s definition of domestic violence). 
This definition is one of many that is used and has been accepted by domestic violence 
advocates. In the UK, “domestic violence” has been defined by the government’s 
Sentencing Council as “any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse 
[psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional] between adults who are or have 
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Domestic violence has a deep and lasting effect not only on 
its victims but on the community as well.26 Victims are more 
likely to abuse alcohol and drugs, report sexual dysfunction, 
attempt suicide, and suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, 
central nervous system disorders, depression, anxiety, and eating 
and personality disorders.27 In 1993, the World Bank released a 
study that estimated that nine million Disability-Adjusted Life 
Years (“DALYs”) are lost annually due to intimate partner 
violence.28 DALYs are the metric used to express the overall 
disease burden measured by the number of years lost by persons 
on average as a result of ill health, disability, or early death.29 In 
2002, the World Bank released another study indicating that 
domestic violence and rape ranked higher than cancer, motor 
vehicle accidents, war, and malaria in the global estimates of 
selected risk factors for increased morbidity, disability, and 
mortality, accounting for an estimated five to sixteen percent of 
healthy years of life lost by females aged fifteen to forty-four 
years of age.30 
                                                                                                                            
been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.” See 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, supra note 24, at 3. 
26. See EVE BUZAWA & CARL BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 11 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the impact of domestic violence beyond the 
individual acts); see also Violence Against Women “Severe, Pervasive” Worldwide, U.N. Report 
Says, MED. NEWS TODAY (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.news-medical.net/news/2006/10/
16/20533.aspx (detailing the worldwide impact of domestic violence). 
27. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 26, at 11–12; Maria L. Imperial, Self-
Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reform for Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING 
POVERTY 3, 6, 10 (1997). 
28. See WORLD BANK, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, HEALTH AND THE ROLE OF THE 
HEALTH SECTOR 3–4 (2009), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTHEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/EXTPHAAG/
0,,contentMDK:22421973~pagePK:64229817~piPK:64229743~theSitePK:672263,00.htm
l#PDF [hereinafter WORLD BANK, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (reporting the physical 
and economic impact of domestic violence); see also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
PREVENTING INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: TAKING 
ACTION AND GENERATING EVIDENCE 5 (2010), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2010/9789241564007_eng.pdf (“Intimate partner violence also has a 
significant adverse economic impact. For example, in the United Kingdom, one 
analysis estimated that its annual cost to the economy in England and Wales was 
approximately £22.9 billion . . . .”).  
29. Global Burden of Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/topics/
global_burden_of_disease/en/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (defining Disability-Adjusted 
Life Years). 
30. See WORLD BANK, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 3 (releasing 
findings that domestic violence and rape are leading causes of increased morbidity, 
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B. The Movement to End Domestic Violence 
In the United States and some Western European 
countries, the movement to end domestic violence dates back to 
the nineteenth century.31 Its development has paralleled the 
feminist movement in these countries.32 Consequently, in the 
early twentieth century, the attention to domestic violence 
waned as the focus of the feminist movement in the United 
States and England was more directed towards suffrage and 
temperance.33 Until the 1960s, the judicial and criminal justice 
responses to domestic violence in these countries diminished.34 
The courts and criminal justice system systematically de-
emphasized the criminal nature of domestic abuse by 
categorizing it as a private family matter.35 Arrests for domestic 
violence were uncommon, and prosecutions and convictions 
were even rarer.36 The typical police, prosecutor, and judicial 
                                                                                                                            
disability, and mortality); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH 
REPORT 2002: REDUCING RISKS, PROMOTING HEALTHY LIFE 80, 82–83 fig.4.9 (2002), 
available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02_en.pdf. 
31. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1289–90 (2000) 
(tracing the movement to end domestic violence in the United States); see also JEFFREY 
FAGAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 157641, THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 6–9 (1996) (noting the historical 
development of the movement against domestic violence). 
32. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1290 (drawing parallels between the involvement of 
the feminist movement and the developments in the movement to end domestic 
violence); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 7–9 (describing the historical development 
of the movement to end domestic violence by noting the role of feminist theory and 
activism). 
33. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1289–90 (noting that the feminist movement at the 
turn of the century was focused on suffrage and temperance, which caused decreased 
attention toward domestic violence); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 6–9 (relating the 
disparate attention paid to domestic violence in the first half of the 20th century by the 
feminist movement to a similar response by the criminal justice system). 
34. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1289–90 (noting that the criminal justice response to 
domestic violence was subdued prior to the 1960s); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 6–7 
(describing how the courts had a hands-off approach to domestic violence prior to the 
1960s). 
35. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1289–90 (noting that the criminal justice response to 
domestic violence historically was to treat domestic violence cases as less serious than 
other types of violence); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 6–7 (describing how the courts 
had a removed approach to domestic violence prior to the 1960s). 
36. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking 
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 4 (1999) 
(“It has long been common practice for police to refuse to arrest, for prosecutors to 
decline to press charges, and for judges to be reluctant to issue civil protection orders 
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response was to treat domestic violence as a “private matter” 
that required compromise and reconciliation within the family.37 
Remnants of this attitude persist even today.38 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the feminist movement 
renewed its attention toward violence against women and began 
creating rape crisis centers, battered women’s shelters, and 
programming for victims of abuse.39 In the United States, local 
governments and the federal and state criminal justice systems 
responded in tandem by establishing government programs to 
combat domestic violence.40 These new efforts included state-
funded shelters, specialized prosecution teams, funding for 
published studies on domestic violence, and batterer 
intervention programs.41 
In the 1980s, violence against women remained in the 
public eye and many jurisdictions in the United States started to 
implement pro-arrest policies for domestic violence.42 These 
                                                                                                                            
or impose meaningful sentences on batterers. In contrast to the remarkable progress 
made by legislators, those responsible for applying and enforcing the law—prosecutors, 
judges, and the court system—have lagged far behind.”); see also Cheryl Hanna, The 
Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1505, 1520–21 (1998) (noting that most domestic violence cases end either in arrest or 
alternatively with a deal being reached with the prosecutor). 
37. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1289–90 (describing the traditional view of domestic 
violence as a private family matter outside the purview of the criminal justice system); 
see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 7–8 (noting the difficulty in overcoming traditional 
perceptions of domestic violence as private family business). 
38. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1538–39 (denoting the traditional perception of 
domestic violence as a private family matter); see also Epstein, supra note 36, at 4 (“It 
has long been common practice for police to refuse to arrest, for prosecutors to decline 
to press charges, and for judges to be reluctant to issue civil protection orders or 
impose meaningful sentences on batterers.”). 
39. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1290 (describing renewed attention to domestic 
violence by the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s); see also FAGAN, supra note 
31, at 7–9 (noting that the progress within the domestic violence movement was 
spurred by feminist activism in the 1960s and 1970s). 
40. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1290 (noting the initial government responses in 
the United States to domestic violence beginning in the 1960s); see also FAGAN, supra 
note 31, at 7–8 (describing the initial local and national government efforts to combat 
domestic violence in the United States). 
41. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1290 (providing a list of early government efforts 
and involvement in the movement to end domestic violence); see also FAGAN, supra note 
31, at 7 (describing the initial responses of governments in combating domestic 
violence, on both local and national levels, in the United States). 
42. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 26, at 140–41 (“As discussed earlier, the 
consensus on the historically limited role of arrest had been shattered by the early 
1980s . . . . A new pro-arrest consensus began to emerge when crisis intervention lost 
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policies increased batterer interaction with the court system, 
leading to the incarceration of many batterers.43 Consequently, 
courts began to hear from victims who did not want their 
abusers incarcerated; they simply wanted the violence to stop.44 
Presented with the challenge that domestic violence was already 
under-reported to the criminal justice system and opinions that 
the current approach to sentencing was re-victimizing victims, 
courts increasingly began to turn to batterer intervention 
programs as a sentencing alternative.45 
                                                                                                                            
adherents.”); BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1 (“With the 
establishment of proarrest policies in the 1980s, increasing numbers of batterers were 
seen in criminal courts across the country.”). 
43. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1. But see RICHARD R. 
PETERSON, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK 
CITY: A STUDY OF DV CASES IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (2003), 
http://www.nycja.org/ research/reports/ressum43.pdf (“During the 1980’s, police 
departments began to shift from a mediation strategy (talking to, but rarely arresting, 
the offender) to a pro-arrest policy in domestic incidents. . . . These changes in police 
practices sought to increase the likelihood of arrest for DV offenders. Interestingly, at 
the time that pro-arrest policies were initially implemented, many domestic violence 
cases were not prosecuted; most domestic violence cases that were prosecuted ended 
with a dismissal.”). 
44. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1 (“Some victims, 
however, began to say that although they wanted the battering to stop, they did not 
want their partners incarcerated.”); see also Epstein, supra note 36, at 17–18; PETERSON, 
supra note 43, at 2 (“Prosecutors viewed [domestic violence] cases as difficult to win 
because many victims were unwilling to cooperate. Victims often refused to press 
charges or to testify against the batterer because of fear of retaliation, a desire to 
continue the relationship, concerns about losing the economic support provided by the 
batterer, or the hope that the battering would stop.”). There are a number of reasons 
why some victims of domestic violence are opposed to their partner’s incarceration. “A 
substantial number of women express fear that their batterer will retaliate with more 
violence if they continue with prosecution. In one study, participants rated ‘fear of the 
batterer’ as the number one reason they were unwilling to cooperate with the 
government.” Deborah Epstein, Margaret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming 
Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long Term Safety in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 476 (2003) (citation 
omitted). In addition, victims may be dependent on their abuser for money, 
healthcare, childcare, transportation, or housing. If they have immigrant status, their 
residency may depend on their batterer. Many battered victims fear that by contacting 
the court system or ending their relationships, they may also lose their children or 
community and family support. See Epstein, Bell & Goodman, supra at 477–82. 
45. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that 
previously-used sentencing options were at odds with victims’ well-being and wishes and 
that batterer intervention programs were developed to respond to these concerns); see 
also HEALEY, SMITH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 1 (observing that, by 1998, studies 
in the United States showed that eighty percent of clients in batterer programs had 
been referred by probation officers or by court mandate). 
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In the 1990s, legislation in the United States (the Violence 
Against Women Act) and the United Kingdom (the Family Law 
Act) pushed for domestic violence to be treated increasingly as a 
crime and provided a greater variety of remedies and 
sanctions.46 Behind these policies lay the theory that domestic 
violence could be reduced if abusers feared reprisal for 
continuing their behavior.47 The justification underlying this 
system is that close monitoring and severe consequences for 
domestic violence offenders will ideally result in decreased 
violence.48 Batterer intervention programs are one of the many 
mechanisms utilized in this effort.49 
Today, many different types of batterer intervention 
programs have been implemented in jurisdictions around the 
world.50 These programs are designed to focus on changing the 
                                                                                                                            
46. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); 
Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27 (Eng.); see Tsai, supra note 31, at 1291 (“In the 1990s, 
legislation strengthened the advances made in the 1980s, further acknowledging the 
need to classify domestic violence as a crime and providing a greater variety of 
remedies and sanctions.”); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 10 (“By 1990, many States 
had developed sweeping and strong legislation that corrected historical wrongs such as 
warrantless arrests in misdemeanor cases or requiring women to file for divorce before 
receiving protective orders. . . . These efforts were institutionalized in law and 
policy with significant changes achieved in statutes, the organization of investigative 
and prosecutorial agencies, and the allocation of court services and resources.” 
(citation omitted)). 
47. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1291 (“The notion is that if an assault in a domestic 
situation goes unpunished by the criminal courts, society will not consider such 
behavior criminal and individuals may engage in family violence without fear of 
reprisal.”); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 11 (“Underlying these reforms was the 
theory that family violence could be stopped through legal sanctions and that legal 
sanctions were effective in reducing violence.”). 
48. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1291 (“Many of these reforms were based on the 
theory that paying close attention to domestic violence cases by imposing legal 
sanctions on batterers would be sufficient to decrease the incidence of domestic 
violence.”); see also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 11 (“Underlying these reforms was the 
theory that family violence could be stopped through legal sanctions and that legal 
sanctions were effective in reducing violence.”). 
49. See Richard M. Tolman & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Intervention for Men Who Batter: A 
Review of Research, in UNDERSTANDING PARTNER VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE, CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS 262, 263–66 (S.R. Stith & M.A. Straus eds., 1995) 
(offering that batterer intervention programs are one tool out of many used in 
combating domestic violence); see also Tsai, supra note 31 at 1318–20 (describing the 
use of batterer intervention programs as a tool in maintaining accountability for 
domestic violence abusers and lessening instances of violence). 
50. See Hanna, supra note 36, at n.102 (“Note that extreme variance remains in 
program design.”); see also Amanda Dekki, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for 
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batterers’ behavior by altering their attitudes toward violence 
and women.51 Batterer intervention programs typically take the 
form of group counseling sessions designed specifically for 
batterers, but may also include individual or couples 
counseling.52 Initially, batterer groups provided educational 
counseling that promoted an anti-sexist message, which focused 
on changing offender attitudes regarding the subordination of 
women.53 As these programs have developed over time, some 
programs have also incorporated cognitive-behavioral 
therapeutic techniques, anger management, and alternative 
conflict resolution behavior skills.54 Regardless of the type, 
batterer intervention programs impact domestic violence cases 
because the court will often defer trial, conviction, or sentencing 
pending the abuser’s participation in such programs.55 
                                                                                                                            
State-Mandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 18 
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549, 566–67 (2004) (describing the different forms of 
batterer intervention programs); KERRY MURPHY HEALEY & CHRISTINE SMITH, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 171683, BATTERER PROGRAMS: WHAT CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AGENCIES NEED TO KNOW 1 (1998). 
51. See Dekki, supra note 50, at 566 (“Batterer Intervention Programs focus on 
changing the perpetrators’ behavior towards, and attitudes about, women.”); see also 
HEALEY & SMITH, supra note 50 (noting the progress in the movement against domestic 
violence). 
52. See MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, TESTING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF BATTERER PROGRAMS AND JUDICIAL MONITORING 6 (2005) 
(discussing the fact that group counseling batterer intervention programs were the 
most common, but that individual and couples counseling were alternative methods); 
Johnna Rizza, Comment, Beyond Duluth: A Broad Spectrum of Treatment for a Broad 
Spectrum of Domestic Violence, 70 MONT. L. REV. 125, 143–44 (2009) (noting the 
appropriate use of other forms of batterer intervention programs such as couples 
counseling); see also supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text (generalizing the kinds of 
batterer intervention programs by method). 
53. See LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 52, at 6 (noting that batterer intervention 
programs were originally designed as educational programs to promote an anti-sexist 
message); Dekki, supra note 50, at 567–68 (noting that the feminist approach to 
batterer intervention programs is one of the most common approaches used today). 
54. See LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 52, at 6 (describing the development of 
programs with an increased scope beyond educational curriculum); David L. Myers, 
Eliminating the Battering of Women by Men: Some Considerations for Behavior Analysis, 28 J. 
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 493, 500 (1995) (describing the various types of treatment 
programs implemented by various jurisdictions today, including models based on anger 
expression, psycho-educational programs, or pro-feminist theories of battering). 
55. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: III. New State 
and Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1541–42 (1993) 
(noting that the successful completion of such programs can lead to dismissal of 
charges); Dekki, supra note 50, at 566 (“Such counseling programs usually ‘defer trial, 
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Although many domestic and international policies, such as 
batterer intervention programs, have increased awareness about 
domestic violence, it remains one of the most serious problems 
facing criminal justice systems around the world.56 In 2006, the 
World Health Organization and the UN issued a report 
declaring that violence against women is “severe,” “pervasive,” 
and common “throughout the world.”57 According to the 
report, at least one out of every three women will be subjected to 
intimate partner violence in the course of her lifetime.58 
C. International Policy on Batterer Intervention Programs 
Given the seriousness of domestic violence, the impact it 
has on families, and its economic consequences, several 
international and regional governing bodies have provided 
directives to their member states regarding domestic violence. 
1. United Nations 
The United Nations has increasingly worked to address 
global domestic violence and, to this effect, has released a 
number of official reports recommending the adoption of 
legislative initiatives to prevent domestic violence to its member 
                                                                                                                            
conviction or sentencing of a criminal defendant pending his voluntary participation in 
a treatment program designed to prevent further violence.’”). 
56. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1309 (noting the seriousness of the problems of 
domestic violence); see also Violence Against Women “Severe, Pervasive” Worldwide, U.N. 
Report Says, supra note 26 (summarizing a UN Report that described the problem of 
domestic violence as “severe and pervasive” worldwide). 
57. U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, ¶ 
183, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006) (“The results have provided compelling 
evidence that violence against women is a severe and pervasive human rights violation 
throughout the world, with devastating effects on the health and well-being of women 
and children.”).  
58. See Violence Against Women “Severe, Pervasive” Worldwide, U.N. Report Says, supra 
note 26 (“[A]t least one in three women [experiences] abuse by an intimate partner at 
some point in their lives . . . .”). Other global studies have indicated the severity of 
domestic violence as well. In a report released in 2000, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (“UNICEF”) asserted that anywhere from twenty to fifty percent of women from 
country to country had experienced domestic violence. Innocenti Research Ctr., 
United Nations Children’s Fund, Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, 6 
INNOCENTI DIGEST 1, 4 (2000). 
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states.59 Among these recommendations, the UN has advocated 
that states utilize batterer intervention programs: 
Legislation should: Provide that intervention programmes 
for perpetrators may be prescribed in sentencing and 
mandate that the operators of such programmes work in 
close cooperation with complainant/survivor service 
providers; [c]larify that the use of alternative sentencing, 
including sentences in which the perpetrator is mandated to 
attend an intervention programme for perpetrators and no 
other penalty is imposed, are to be approached with serious 
caution and only handed down in instances where there will 
be continuous monitoring of the sentence by justice officials 
and women’s non-governmental organizations . . . .60 
In an updated release of recommendations, the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs qualified its earlier 
recommendation by noting that where funding is limited, 
services for survivors should be prioritized over programs for 
offenders.61 
Although recommendations such as these are not binding 
mandates on UN member states, the UN may compare a 
member state’s action to end domestic violence with these 
recommendations when determining a state’s treaty compliance 
                                                                                                                            
59. See The International Legal Framework, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/domestic/laws/international.htm (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2012) (“International law and policy on domestic violence has developed in the 
[UN] and in regional organizations such as the [COE], and is in the process of being 
developed in the European Union. The recognition that domestic violence is a human 
rights violation under international law required decades of work by activists around 
the world. Now, international legal instruments and policy statements make clear that 
states have a duty under international law to prevent domestic violence and punish 
domestic violence offenders.”); see, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Intensification of Efforts 
to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/65/208 (Aug. 2, 
2010); U.N. Dep’t for Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for the Advancement of Women, 
Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, ¶¶ 3.1.1–3.1.5, ST/ESA/329 (2010) 
[hereinafter Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women]; U.N. Secretary-General, 
In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, supra note 57, ¶¶ 55–56. See 
generally U.N. Group of Experts, Rep., Good Practices in Legislation on “Harmful Practices” 
Against Women (May 26–29, 2009); U.N. Group of Experts, Rep., Good Practices in 
Legislation on Violence Against Women (May 26–28, 2008). 
60. Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, supra note 59, ¶ 3.11.6. 
61. See id. (“Where limited funding is available, services for survivors should be 
prioritized over programmes for perpetrators . . . .”). 
580 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:565 
and responsibility for human rights violations.62 These types of 
recommendations influence state action, particularly in the area 
of human rights law.63 
In addition, states who adhere to the International Bill of 
Human Rights or who have signed and ratified the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW”) are obligated to prevent international 
human rights violations.64 The International Bill of Human 
Rights includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
its implementing covenants, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).65 
Although the International Bill of Human Rights does not 
explicitly mention domestic violence, it does, along with the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, stipulate a state’s duty to 
protect fundamental human rights, rights that are typically 
violated in domestic violence cases.66 Specifically, these rights 
                                                                                                                            
62. See The International Legal Framework, supra note 59 (noting how legislative 
recommendations by the UN influence and affect state action). 
63. See id. (quoting Rebecca J. Cook, who stated that recommendations from the 
UN are “signposts of the direction in which international human rights law is 
developing and should influence states that have accepted a commitment of 
progressive development toward enhanced respect for human rights in their 
international conduct and domestic law.”). 
64. See id. (stating that governments have a responsibility under the UN 
framework to protect individuals from offenses by private actors in the domestic 
violence context); Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human Rights 
Law—Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalisation?: Some 
Current Issues, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 205, 227–28 (1992) (“Under the general human 
rights treaties (as well as other treaties), the State is considered to be under an 
obligation not only to refrain from taking direct action which infringes individual 
rights but also to take positive steps to ensure that individuals actually enjoy those 
rights. This latter aspect of the obligation includes in certain circumstances a duty to 
take appropriate measures to protect individuals against violation of those rights by 
private persons.”). 
65. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see The International Legal Framework, 
supra note 59 (defining the contents of the International Bill of Human Rights); see also 
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rts., The International Bill of Human Rights, Fact 
Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1) (June 1996), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/
factsheet2rev.1en.pdf [hereinafter International Bill of Human Rights Fact Sheet]. 
66. See The International Legal Framework, supra note 59 (noting that domestic 
violence is not specifically mentioned in the International Bill of Human Rights, but 
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may include: the right to life, the right to physical and mental 
integrity, the right to equal protection of the laws, and the right 
to be free from discrimination.67 Likewise, CEDAW prohibits 
violence against women and binds countries that have ratified it 
to provide protection against such violence.68 CEDAW has been 
ratified by 187 countries, including Brazil, India, and the United 
Kingdom.69 The treaty encourages states to combat domestic 
violence, in part by requiring parties to “agree to take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation and temporary 
special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”70 While the UN has qualified 
the appropriate use of batterer intervention programs, its 
general legislative recommendations for such programs remain 
at the discretion of the states.71 
                                                                                                                            
that rights protected by the Bill are commonly violated in domestic violence cases); see 
also International Bill of Human Rights Fact Sheet, supra note 65. 
67. See The International Legal Framework, supra note 59 (listing the rights covered 
by the International Bill of Human Rights that are commonly called into question in 
domestic violence cases); see also International Bill of Human Rights Fact Sheet, supra 
note 65. 
68. See Jodie G. Roure, Domestic Violence in Brazil: Examining Obstacles and 
Approaches to Promote Legislative Reform, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 70 (2009) 
(“[The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”)] prohibits most forms of violence against women, and those countries that 
ratify or accede to it are legally bound to provide women protection against such 
violence.”); see also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women: Overview of the Convention, U.N. DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (specifying the 
terms of CEDAW and the obligations of signatories). 
69. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, signatories and ratifications 
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
70. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: 
Overview of the Convention, supra note 68; see also U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. 
for the Advancement of Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence 
Against Women, ¶¶ 9, 24, U.N. Doc A/47/38 (1992) (describing the state obligations 
under CEDAW to protect and ensure that women enjoy their fundamental freedoms). 
71. See supra notes 60–62 (regarding the influence of UN recommendations on 
member states); see also infra notes 117–18, 126–28 and accompanying text (noting the 
influence of international law on domestic state action working to end domestic 
violence). 
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2. Council of Europe 
The COE is an international organization comprised of 
forty-seven European member states whose purpose is to 
develop common standards of human rights and economic and 
social progress.72 Its principles are drawn from the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(known more commonly as the European Convention on 
Human Rights) and other reference texts related to the 
protection of individuals.73 Similar to the UN, the COE has 
issued legislative recommendations for its member states that 
endorse batterer intervention programs.74 
The COE’s recommendation articulates that states should 
organize intervention programs designed to “encourage 
perpetrators of violence to adopt a violence-free pattern of 
behaviour,” not as an alternative to sentencing but as an 
additional measure.75 The recommendation also says that states 
                                                                                                                            
72. See Council of Europe in Brief: Who We Are, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=quiSommesNous (last visited Jan. 6, 
2012) (defining the role of the COE); Statute of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. 
No. 1, art. 1(a), Aug. 3, 1949 (establishing one of the COE’s aims as being to achieve “a 
greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the 
ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic 
and social progress”). 
73. See Council of Europe in Brief: Who We Are, supra note 72 (defining the role of 
the COE and the basis of its principles in the European Convention on Human 
Rights); see also EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1031 on the Honouring of Commitments Entered 
into by Member States When Joining the Council of Europe, 2d Sess., ¶ 9, Doc. No. 7037 
(1994) [hereinafter Resolution 1031]. 
74. See Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 
the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Women Against 
Violence, ¶ 4 (Apr. 30, 2002), available at https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.
jsp?id=280915 [hereinafter Recommendation Rec(2002)5] (recommending legislative 
initiatives and general principles to its member states); see also CAROL HAGEMANN-
WHITE & SABINE BOHN, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTING WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE: 
ANALYTICAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATION 
REC(2002)5 ON THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE IN COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE MEMBER STATES 7 (2007) (noting that the COE’s Recommendation 
Rec(2002)5 “expresses a consensus on general principles as well as describing 
necessary measures in services, legislation, policing, intervention with perpetrators, 
awareness-raising, education and training and data collection”). 
75. See Recommendation Rec(2002)5, supra note 74, ¶¶ 50–53 (outlining the 
COE’s recommendation to its member states on batterer intervention programs); see 
also HAGEMANN-WHITE & BOHN, supra note 74, at 28 (noting that programs for 
perpetrators should be conducted while keeping the victim’s safety in mind). 
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should consider establishing state-approved intervention 
centers.76 
All members of the COE are bound to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.77 Under the Convention, states 
are obligated to secure for their citizens certain rights, including 
the right to life, the right to be free from torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment, and the right to equal protection 
under the Convention, among others.78 While the COE’s 
recommendations are like the UN’s—not binding on member 
states—they have influenced what actions states are expected to 
take to combat domestic violence. Further, the decision in Opuz 
v. Turkey, handed down by the European Court of Human 
Rights, has expanded the reach of these recommendations.79 In 
Opuz, the petitioner, Nahide Opuz, and her mother had been 
subjected to brutal domestic violence from her husband for a 
number of years.80 Although Opuz and her mother had both 
informed police and prosecuting attorneys of the abuse, the 
                                                                                                                            
76. See Recommendation Rec(2002)5, supra note 74, ¶ 52 (“Member states should 
. . . consider establishing specialised state-approved intervention centres for violent 
men and support centres initiated by NGOs and associations within the resources 
available . . . .”). 
77. See Resolution 1031, supra note 73, ¶ 1; see also Council of Europe in Brief: Who We 
Are, supra note 72 (defining the role of the COE and the basis of its principles in the 
European Convention on Human Rights). 
78. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms arts. 1–3, 14, Feb. 28, 1996, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by 
Protocol 11 to The European Convention on Human Rights, 33 I.L.M. 943; see also Lee 
Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human 
Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 190, 200–01 (2010) (“Before the [European Court on Human Rights], the 
young woman alleged violations of several European Convention articles, including 
Article 3, which guarantees freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, Article 8, which states that every person ‘has the right to respect for his 
private and family life,’ Article 13, which guarantees an effective remedy for those 
whose rights have been violated, and Article 14, which guarantees equal protection of 
rights enumerated in the Convention.”). 
79. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a2f84392.pdf; see Opuz v Turkey: European 
Court Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, INTERIGHTS, 
http://www.interights.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (noting that this landmark ruling 
elaborates on state obligations to protect their citizens from domestic violence).  
80. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 7–69 (citing the facts of the case); see also 
Opuz v Turkey: European Court Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic 
Violence, supra note 79 (describing the circumstances of the case brought by petitioner 
Nahide Opuz). 
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state failed to adequately protect the women from future abuse, 
which ultimately culminated in the death of the petitioner’s 
mother.81 In its ruling, the European Court of Human Rights 
found Turkey liable to Opuz under the European Convention 
on Human Rights because the state had failed to adequately 
protect the petitioner and her mother from this violence.82 The 
court held that domestic violence is a form of discrimination 
under the Convention, which requires effective state action 
regarding prevention.83 Notably, the court recognized that the 
state’s failure to adequately respond to the threat of domestic 
violence against Opuz was a violation of the nondiscrimination 
clause of Article 14 of the Convention.84 The European Court 
also found that Turkey had violated Articles 2 and 3, the right to 
life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, 
respectively.85 Turkey was forced to pay damages to Opuz.86 
This ruling is significant because many critics of batterer 
intervention programs argue that they are ineffective and 
jeopardize victim safety, which could be considered tantamount 
to states not taking the threat of domestic violence seriously.87 
                                                                                                                            
81. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 47–54; see also Opuz v Turkey: European Court 
Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra note 79 (describing 
the circumstances of the case brought by petitioner Nahide Opuz). 
82. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 191 (“It transpires from the above-mentioned 
rules and decisions that the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this failure does not need 
to be intentional.”); see also Opuz v Turkey: European Court Clarifies State Obligations to 
Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra note 79 (“Critically, for the first time the 
Court recognised the failure to adequately respond to gender-based violence as a 
violation of Article 14 of the Convention, the non-discrimination clause.”). 
83. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 184–91; see also Opuz v Turkey: European 
Court Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra note 79. 
84. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 177–79, 214 n.7; see also Opuz v Turkey: 
European Court Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra 
note 79. 
85. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 128–76, 214 nn.4–5; see also Opuz v Turkey: 
European Court Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra 
note 79 (discussing the findings of the European Court). 
86. See Opuz, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 214; see also Opuz v Turkey: European Court 
Clarifies State Obligations to Protect Women from Domestic Violence, supra note 79 (noting 
that Turkey was ordered to pay Opuz £30,000 in damages). 
87. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 339 (2d ed. 2008) (“Provocative hypotheses have been put 
forward by observers discouraged at the extent to which convicted domestic violence 
offenders continue to serve only minimal prison sentences, or to avoid incarceration 
altogether. One such hypothesis is that the criminal justice system continues to 
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D. Domestic Policy on Batterer Intervention Programs 
While a number of countries enacted domestic violence 
legislation calling for the implementation of batterer 
intervention programs years ago, some countries have only 
enacted such laws recently.88 This Section discusses the 
approaches of countries that fall in both categories. Both the 
United States and England are countries whose national 
domestic violence policies have been in effect for a sustained 
period of time and, as a result, a number of studies have been 
conducted as to their effectiveness.89 These countries’ policies 
have influenced the recommendations of the UN and COE, 
who, in turn, have affected countries that have more recently 
enacted national domestic violence statutes, such as Brazil and 
India. 
1. United States 
Although major developments in the movement to end 
domestic violence over the past forty years originated in the 
United States, domestic violence still affects a significant 
proportion of Americans.90 Approximately 1.5 million women 
are raped or physically assaulted by an intimate partner in the 
United States each year, a statistic that fails to include 
nonphysical forms of domestic violence.91 Of these domestic 
                                                                                                                            
discriminate against victims of domestic violence, and covertly condone the behavior of 
perpetrators, by imposing more lenient sentences in these cases than in parallel 
stranger violence cases.”); see also BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 
26 (“The stakes for women’s safety are simply too high to rely heavily on the use of 
[batterer intervention programs] without stronger empirical evidence that they 
work.”). 
88. See infra Part I.D.1–4. The United States and England both enacted national 
domestic violence legislation and initiatives over ten years ago. In contrast, Brazil and 
India have both enacted legislation designed to combat domestic violence within the 
past five or six years. 
89. See infra Part I.D.1–2 (discussing the legislation and initiatives undertaken in 
the United States and England); infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (discussing 
studies on the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs). 
90. See Innocenti Research Ctr., supra note 58, at 5, tbl.2 (finding that twenty-eight 
percent of US women reported at least one episode of physical violence from their 
partner); supra Part I.A (stating that many major developments in the movement to 
end domestic violence originated in the United States in conjunction with the feminist 
movement). 
91. See Dekki, supra note 50, at 551 (detailing that approximately 1.5 million 
women are raped and/or physically assaulted by an intimate partner in the United 
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violence cases, few ever make it to the courtroom.92 Despite 
developments made in some localities that implement rigorous 
prosecution policies, such as “no-drop” policies and specialized 
prosecution units, the majority of domestic violence cases in the 
United States end with the arrest of the abuser, but no 
prosecution thereafter.93 The cases that are prosecuted often 
result in reduced charges.94 Typically, in instances where 
prosecutors continue forward, the end result is a period of 
probation contingent upon completion of a batterer treatment 
program.95 
Although batterer treatment programs originated in only a 
handful of localities, their widespread employment throughout 
the United States is a result of federal and state policy 
endorsements.96 In 1984, the US Attorney General’s Task Force 
                                                                                                                            
States every year). See generally PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000) (presenting findings from the National 
Violence Against Women Survey on domestic violence in the United States). 
92. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 342 (reporting a study in New York 
County that showed that 
Domestic violence cases were twice as likely as non-domestic violence cases to 
be dismissed. Of those cases prosecuting resulting in conviction, 72% of 
domestic violence cases resulted in some conditional discharge, including 
participation in a batterer treatment program or drug and alcohol treatment, 
compared with 47% of non-domestic cases. Only 17% of domestic violence 
defendants received a sentence that included jail, as opposed to 45% of the 
non-domestic cases.); 
see also Hanna, supra note 36, at 1520–21 (noting that most domestic violence cases end 
in arrest, or alternatively with a deal being reached with the prosecutor). 
93. See Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or 
Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) (noting that the “no-drop 
policy” is the commonly used expression for policies that limit prosecutorial discretion 
and influence from the victim in deciding whether domestic violence cases will be 
pursued); see also Hanna, supra note 36, at 1520–21 (recognizing that although many 
jurisdictions are forming specialized prosecution units and implementing “no-drop” 
policies, most domestic violence cases end in arrest). 
94. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1520–21 (explaining how domestic violence cases 
that make it past the arrest stage are often pled down to reduced charges); SCHNEIDER 
ET AL., supra note 87, at 342 (noting that only seventeen percent of domestic violent 
defendants receive a sentence including jail time, as opposed to forty-five percent of 
nondomestic violence cases). 
95. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1520–21 (noting that domestic violence cases that 
make it through the court process usually result in a sentencing equating to a period of 
probation in conjunction with completion of a batterer treatment program). 
96. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1526 (noting that following a report from the 
Attorney General in 1984, the federal government and a number of states implemented 
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on Family Violence lent credibility to the use of batterer 
intervention programs when it encouraged their use in domestic 
violence cases not involving serious injury to the victim.97 
Subsequent to the Attorney General’s endorsement, state and 
federal governments alike have followed a “faith in treatment” 
philosophy that utilizes incarceration alternatives designed to 
rehabilitate offenders and address the underlying causes of 
certain offenses.98 In 1994, the US Congress passed the Violence 
Against Women Act, which also instituted batterer treatment 
programs for violations of its criminal provisions.99 This 
legislation was reauthorized in 2000 and again in 2005, and the 
recommendation that batterer treatment programs be used in 
domestic violence sentencing remains part of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines today.100 The use of such programs 
continues in spite of the fact that no empirical evidence exists to 
                                                                                                                            
“faith in treatment” policies, which included the use of batterer intervention 
programs); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 342 (describing the endorsement of 
batterer intervention programs by the US Attorney General and its influence). 
97. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1526 (“In 1984, the Attorney General’s Task 
Force on Family Violence . . . recommended incarceration for serious offenses, it 
encouraged the use of batterer treatment programs in cases where the injury to the 
victim was not serious.”); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 342 (“In 1984, the 
Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence threw its significant weight behind 
court-mandated batterers’ treatment as an appropriate response to domestic violence 
crimes, except for the most serious. Whether that recommendation was sound remains 
an open question.”). 
98. See Hanna, supra note 36, at 1526 (opining that states and the federal 
government have followed a “faith in treatment” philosophy for domestic violence 
sentencing following the Attorney General’s endorsement). States that follow a “faith 
in treatment” domestic violence sentencing policy include Alaska, California, and 
Florida. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101(1) (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097(a)(6) 
(Deering 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.281 (LexisNexis 2011). 
99. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 
108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.); 18 
U.S.C. § 3563(a) (2006) (“The court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a 
sentence of probation . . . (4) for a domestic violence crime . . . by a defendant 
convicted of such an offense for the first time that the defendant attend a public, 
private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program . . . .”); see also Hanna, 
supra note 36, at 1526 (“The VAWA also endorses batterer treatment programs for 
violations of its criminal provisions.”); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 355 
(detailing the passage and significance of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994). 
100. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 355 (“The Violence Against Women 
Act was reauthorized in 2000, and again in 2005.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a)(4) (2010) (“For a domestic violence crime . . . a 
defendant convicted of such an offense for the first time . . . shall attend a public, 
private, or non-profit offender rehabilitation program . . . .”). 
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suggest that there is any direct correlation between these 
programs and an offender’s attitudes, beliefs, or behavior.101 
2. England 
As in the United States, domestic violence is pervasive in 
England and has a significant impact on the criminal justice 
system. Each week, two women are killed in England (and 
Wales) as a result of domestic violence.102 In addition, statistics 
show that one in four women will endure domestic violence in 
her lifetime.103 
England has enacted several pieces of national legislation to 
confront domestic violence, including the Domestic Violence 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act in 1976, the Family Law Act in 
1996, and the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act in 
2004.104 These laws increased the protection of victims of 
domestic violence by providing for orders of protection, 
restraining and occupation orders, and increased penalties for 
acts of domestic violence.105 More recently, in 2006, the United 
                                                                                                                            
101. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 343 (summarizing data and 
research regarding the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs, and 
determining that there is no conclusive evidence to suggest such programs are 
effective); BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 26 (explaining that 
batterer intervention programs’ inconsistency and indeterminable success should 
inhibit the government’s use of such programs for the sake of victim safety). 
102. See Inconsistent Sentencing for Domestic Violence, WOMEN’S AID FED’N ENGLAND 
(Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp?itemid=
1038&itemTitle=Inconsistent+sentencing+for+domestic+violence&section=00010001
002200070001&sectionTitle=Articles%3A+criminal+law (“Currently two women every 
week in England and Wales are killed as a result of domestic violence . . .”); see also 
Cutting Support Services for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence Could Lead to a Rise in Murders, 
Campaigners Warn, NAT’L HOUSING FED’N (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.housing.org.uk/
?page=606 (citing that two women are killed every week in England and Wales as a 
result of domestic violence). 
103. See Inconsistent Sentencing for Domestic Violence, supra note 102 (“[I]n England 
and Wales . . . 1 in 4 women experience domestic violence at some point in their 
lifetimes . . . .”); Legal and Physical Security, EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/key-projects/how-fair-is-britain/online-
summary/legal-and-physical-security/ (“1 in 4 women have experienced some form of 
domestic abuse in England and Wales since reaching the age of 16 . . . .”).  
104. Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1976 (repealed 
1.10.1997), c. 50 (Eng.); Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, Part IV (Eng.); Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victim’s Act, 2004, c. 28 (Eng.). 
105. See Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1976 (repealed 
1.10.1997), c. 50 (Eng.); Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, Part IV (Eng.); Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victim’s Act, 2004, c. 28 (Eng.); see also U.N. Office on Drugs and 
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Kingdom Sentencing Guidelines Council (“Council”) released a 
directive on domestic violence sentencing.106 Among its general 
principles, the Council sets forth that in certain circumstances 
the court should consider whether the preferred sentencing 
option is a suspended sentence or a community order including 
a requirement to attend a batterer intervention program.107 The 
Council added that a sentence that includes a batterer 
intervention program is only appropriate “where the court is 
satisfied that the offender genuinely intends to reform his or her 
behaviour and that there is a real prospect of rehabilitation 
being successful.”108 
As in the United States, the endorsement of batterer 
intervention programs is undermined by studies whose findings 
remain inconclusive as to the effectiveness of such programs.109 
                                                                                                                            
Crime & U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Expert Group Meeting on good 
practices in legislation on violence against women, The Struggle for Justice: The State’s 
Response to Violence against Women, 3–6, U.N. Doc. EGM/GPLVAW/2008/EP.02 (May 
12, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_
2008/expertpapers/EGMGPLVAW%20Paper%20(Funmi%20Johnson).pdf. 
106. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, supra note 24 (providing guidelines 
for the judiciary in England and Wales to use for sentencing in domestic violence cases, 
prioritizing aggravating factors and sentencing options); see also Domestic Violence 
Offenders to Get Noncustodial Sentences, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/apr/12/crime.penal1 (detailing the 
inclusion of non-custodial options to sentencing in the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council’s directive to the judiciary). 
107. See supra note 106 (citing the Sentencing Guidelines Council approach to 
batterer intervention programs in its definitive guidelines issued to judges). 
108. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, supra note 24 (noting when a 
noncustodial or batterer’s intervention program may be used as an alternative sentence 
in domestic violence cases); see also Domestic Violence Offenders to Get Noncustodial 
Sentences, supra note 106 (describing how the guidelines provided by the Sentencing 
Council will allow a domestic violence offender to receive a noncustodial sentence, 
such as one mandated attendance at a batterer intervention program, if he or she 
demonstrates remorse to the judge). 
109. See Sheila Burton & Audrey Mullender, Reducing Violence . . . What Works? 
Perpetrator Programmes, CRIME REDUCTION RESEARCH SERIES (2000), at 2 (citing, for 
example, that the “CHANGE and Lothian Domestic Violence Probation Project 
(Dobash et. al[sic], 1996) showed 67% of men avoided further violence for a year after 
the programmes as against only 25% of men subject to other disposals. However, the 
sample declined over time and so the suggested 67% success rate represented only 
40.2% of those who responded initially . . . . The numbers involved in the study were 
extremely low by the end, and cause and effect claims require larger numbers than 
this”); MINISTRY OF JUST., WHAT WORKS WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS?, supra 
note 14 (detailing studies and research regarding the ineffectiveness of batterer 
intervention programs in the UK and abroad).  
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As a policy, batterer intervention has also been criticized by 
domestic violence and women’s advocacy groups.110 For 
example, the Chief Executive of Refuge, a domestic violence 
advocacy group, opposed the sentencing guideline policy 
towards batterer intervention programs stating that: “The idea 
that sending domestic violence perpetrators on courses as an 
alternative to a custodial sentence is ludicrous and would put 
more lives at risk.”111 These same groups have also criticized this 
type of sentencing as allowing too much discretion and creating 
inconsistency in domestic violence cases.112 
Despite this criticism, England has continued to use 
batterer intervention programs with encouragement from the 
UN.113 Moreover, the UN has praised the United Kingdom’s 
                                                                                                                            
110. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Offenders to Get Noncustodial Sentences, supra note 106 
(reporting the reaction of women’s activist groups to the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council draft provision regarding batterer treatment programs, a provision that 
remained in the guidelines through to the final version); Domestic Violence and 
Sentencing Guidelines: Select Committee Submission, REFUGE (May 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.refuge.org.uk/cms_content_refuge/attachments/29-0605-Domestic%
20Violence%20and%20Sentencing%20Guidelines.doc (providing the reaction of 
Refuge, a domestic violence activist group, to the Sentencing Guidelines Council draft 
of the overarching principles and definitive guidelines for domestic violence safety).  
111. James Slack, Wife Beaters Who Say Sorry Will Escape Jail, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), 
Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-382817/Wife-beaters-say-sorry-
escape-jail.html (quoting Refuge spokesperson Sandra Horley on the proposal by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council to accommodate non-custodial sentences for offenders 
who demonstrate remorse for their violent behavior); see Domestic Violence Offenders to 
Get Non-custodial Sentences, supra note 106 (referring to statements made by a Refuge 
spokesperson criticizing some of the guidelines put forth by the UK Sentencing 
Guidelines Council). 
112. See Inconsistent Sentencing for Domestic Violence, supra note 102 (“Court 
sentencing for domestic violence is often inconsistent and sentences do not always 
reflect the severity of the crime.”); see also Emine Saner, So What’s the Point of Going to 
Court?, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/aug/
24/ukcrime.gender  (providing several examples of judicial discretion questionably 
being abused in domestic violence cases to give lesser sentences to wealthy and affluent 
abusers). 
113. See U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women & U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Rep. of the Expert Group Meeting, Good Practices in Legislation on Violence 
Against Women, May 26–28 2008, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/violence/UN%20Guidelines%20on%20legislation.pdf [hereinafter 
U.N. Rep., Good Practices, May 2008] (asserting that the United Kingdom utilizes 
batterer intervention programs in a positive light); see also Handbook for Legislation on 
Violence against Women, supra note 59 (recognizing the use of batterer intervention 
programs in the United Kingdom). 
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Integrated Domestic Abuse Program as a sentencing option in 
its report on good practices in legislation.114 
3. Brazil 
Every fifteen seconds a woman in Brazil is beaten by her 
intimate partner or ex-partner, another is prevented from 
leaving her home by her abuser, or yet another is forced to have 
sexual relations against her will.115 Almost seventy percent of 
female murder victims are killed as victims of domestic 
relations.116 
These statistics and others like them served as the impetus 
behind a 2003 recommendation by the CEDAW Committee that 
Brazil “adopt ‘without delay legislation on domestic violence’ 
and ‘practical measures to follow-up and monitor the 
application of such a law and evaluate its effectiveness.’”117 It was 
this recommendation, in tandem with other international 
human rights laws and principles, which led to the enactment of 
the first national legislation criminalizing domestic violence in 
Brazil.118 
                                                                                                                            
114. See U.N. Rep., Good Practices, May 2008, supra note 113, at 61 (“The United 
Kingdom has had positive experiences with the Integrated Domestic Abuse Programme 
as an option in sentencing.”); see also Handbook for Legislation on Violence against Women, 
supra note 59 (positing that the United Kingdom has had good experiences using 
batterer intervention programs). 
115. See Roure, supra note 68, at 92 (discussing the frequency of domestic violence 
in Brazil); see also Shadow Report, Brazil and Compliance with CEDAW, THE CIVIL SOCIETY 
7 (2007), available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/BRAZIL_
SHADOWREPORT_CEDAW_June,18%5B1%5D.pdf [hereinafter SHADOW REPORT] 
(reporting the prevalence of domestic violence in Brazil, as well as the state inaction 
regarding this type of violence).  
116. See Roure, supra note 68, at 92; SHADOW REPORT, supra note 115 (reporting 
on domestic violence statistics and the entrenchment of domestic violence in Brazil). 
117. SHADOW REPORT, supra note 115, at 7 (recommending that Brazil’s 
government take affirmative action and implement legislation to protect its citizens 
against domestic violence); see Roure, supra note 68, at 91 (emphasizing the 
importance of CEDAW’s recommendation to Brazil on domestic violence in the 
eventual implementation of legislative reform in the nation). 
118. See Roure, supra note 68, at 69 (“International human rights laws and 
principles can provide an important source of inspiration and a rallying point for social 
change. The domestic violence reform in Brazil illustrates this fact.”); see also SHADOW 
REPORT, supra note 115 (noting that Law 11340/2006 (Law “Maria da Penha”) was 
approved in 2006, creating mechanisms and instituting reforms to restrain domestic 
violence and bring Brazilian law into compliance with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention of 
Belém do Pará). 
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In 2006, Brazil enacted the Maria da Penha law, 
criminalizing domestic violence by allowing a domestic violence 
offender to be arrested for committing an offense, as well as  
preventatively, if the aggressor is determined to be a threat to 
the victim’s life.119 The usual sentence given to an offender after 
a trial on a domestic violence charge under the Maria da Penha 
law is a three- to four-month long suspended jail sentence, along 
with mandatory participation in a batterer intervention 
program.120 While this is a marked improvement from sentences 
given to domestic violence offenders prior to 2006, the use of 
batterer treatment programs in Brazil remains in doubt.121 
4. India 
In India, as in many countries, domestic violence exists 
within the cultural norms of a patriarchal social structure.122 
                                                                                                                            
119. Lei No. 11340, de 7 de Agosto de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 8.8.2006 (Braz.); see Trygve Olfarnes, Preventing Gender-Based Violence in Brazil: Will 
Therapy Work?, UNFPA (May 19, 2009), http://www.unfpa.org/public/site/global/
lang/en/pid/2720 [hereinafter UNFPA] (detailing the passage of the Maria da Penha 
law and its main source of enforcement); see also Lei Maria da Penha, VAWNET.ORG, 
http://www.vawnet.org/summary.php?doc_id=1249&find_type=web_sum_GC (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012) (providing a brief description of the Maria da Penha law, which was 
enacted in 2006).  
120. See UNFPA, supra note 119 (“The usual outcome of a trial involving gender-
based violence is a 3–4 month-long suspended jail sentence along with mandatory 
attendance of 20 group therapy sessions at SerH.”). 
121. Although domestic violence was not a crime prior to 2006 in Brazil, cases of 
domestic violence were often tried in a Special Court under Law 9,099/95. See Roure, 
supra note 68, at 68. Punishments under this law for domestic violence acts included 
donation of food baskets to charity or payments of fines. See Roure, supra note 68, at 81 
(relating the author’s personal experience and firsthand accounts of sentences that 
included donations to charity or fines); see also UNFPA, supra note 119 (“Critics claim 
that the program may give offenders an easy way out of a jail sentence, and that it does 
not have the intended preventive effect.”). Limited resources in Brazil have also been 
discussed as hampering domestic violence initiatives. See Roure, supra note 68, at 94 
(“Despite the increased resources, funding remains insufficient.”). 
122. See Paul Subrata, Combating Domestic Violence through Positive International 
Action in the International Community and in the United Kingdom, India, and Africa, 7 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 236 (1999) (“Wife beating has been widely accepted 
as an integral part of the patriarchal social structure in India, under which women are 
considered to be inferior.”); Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in India: 
Economic Abuse and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretation to PROMOTE Women’s 
Fundamental Rights, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 185 (2006) (“This pervasive gender 
discrimination is deeply rooted in the notion of patriarchy, endorsed through a 
woman’s life, from her childhood through death.”); see also UNESCO, VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN: REPORTS FROM INDIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2 (1993), available 
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India’s concept of family and familial relations adds to the 
impact of domestic violence.123 In many households in India, a 
husband and wife live with the husband’s entire family, which in 
some instances leads to violence being perpetuated by both the 
husband and the in-laws.124 A 2002 survey report showed that 
eighty-five percent of Indian men admitted to engaging in some 
form of domestic violence in the previous year.125 
As a result of the Indian government’s increasing 
participation in the international community as a member of 
international organizations and a signatory to treaties, it has 
progressively taken action in the field of domestic violence.126 In 
1995 at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 
India ratified CEDAW and adopted the Beijing Platform of 
Action.127 It was not until 2005, however, that the Indian 
                                                                                                                            
at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0009/000966/096629eo.pdf (“Violence against 
women, then, has to be seen in the context of the Indian society in transition which has 
committed itself to the values of equality and justice, but which is unable to make the 
dominant socio-economic segments and the male population relinquish their 
traditionally held rights and power over the weaker segments and women.”). 
123. See Subrata, supra note 122, at 238 (“India’s family system is an extended 
family where husband and wife live with the husband’s entire family. This has created a 
situation where the in-laws, often the mother-in-law, contribute to the violence 
perpetrated by the husband against the wife.”). See generally Marilyn Fernandez, 
Domestic Violence by Extended Family Members in India: Interplay of Gender and Generation, 
12 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 433 (1997) (reporting the involvement of extended 
family members in domestic violence incidents in India).  
124. See Subrata, supra note 122, at 238 (explaining the structure of a typical 
Indian family, and the involvement of the extended family in domestic disputes). 
125. See INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, MEN, MASCULINITY AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN INDIA 58 (2002), available at http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/
Domestic-Violence-in-India-4-Men-Masculinity-and-Domestic-Violence-in-India.pdf 
(reporting the prevalence and relative acceptance of domestic violence in India, as 
eighty-five percent of men admitted to engaging in some form of domestic violence in 
the past year). 
126. See Vyas, supra note 122, at 196–200 (describing India’s international 
agreements and participation as it regards domestic violence and violence against 
women); see also Subrata, supra note 122, at 240 (describing India’s early integration 
into the international community on the subject of domestic violence). 
127. See Subrata, supra note 122, at 230 (detailing India’s participation in the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and its ratification of CEDAW); see 
also Call to End Violence Against Fair Sex, THE HINDU, Nov. 26, 1998 (reporting India’s 
ratification of CEDAW). The Beijing Platform of Action was adopted in 1995 at the UN 
World Conference of Women by 187 countries. See Subrata, supra note 122, at 230. The 
crux of the Platform specifies the need to take steps to reduce violence against women 
and encompasses a comprehensive program for addressing the ways in which women 
are subordinated. See id. 
594 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:565 
government adopted comprehensive domestic violence 
legislation, specifically, the Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence Act.128 Previously, Indian law included only two 
domestic-violence-related statutes.129 One, the Anti-Dowry statute 
is directed at dowry-related-violence, the other, the Anti-Cruelty 
statute, deals with acts of “extreme cruelty” and applies in cases 
where women are driven to commit suicide or if grave injury is 
inflicted.130 The 2005 statute was intended to address acts of 
domestic violence previously not covered by these statutes.131 
The 2005 law also addresses the use of batterer intervention 
programs, specifically counseling programs.132 Under Section 18 
(Chapter 18) of the Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence Act, a judge may mandate that an offender attend 
counseling either alone or with his partner.133 This option is 
considered controversial because victims can also be ordered to 
attend the counseling sessions.134 Additionally, the effectiveness 
                                                                                                                            
128. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, 
INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12; see Vyas, supra note 122, at 179 (stating that India passed 
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in 2005).  
129. See Vyas, supra note 122, at 178–79 (“Domestic violence legislation in India 
has historically been directed toward dowry related violence, thereby excluding the 
myriad of cases involving domestic violence for reasons unrelated to dowry demands. 
Until recently, only two laws addressed domestic violence: the Anti-Dowry statute and 
the Anti-Cruelty statute.”); see also PEN. CODE (1986) § 304B (India) (India’s Anti-
Dowry statute); PEN. CODE (1983) § 498A (India) (India’s Anti-Cruelty statute). 
130. See PEN. CODE (1986) § 304B (India) (India’s Anti-Dowry statute); PEN. CODE 
(1983) § 498A (India) (India’s Anti-Cruelty statute); Vyas, supra note 122, at 178–79 
(describing the nature and extent of India’s domestic violence laws prior to 2005, as 
being limited in application to dowry incidents and acts of “extreme cruelty”). 
131. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, 
INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12; Vyas, supra note 122, at 178–79 (“Due to these limited 
characterizations, perpetrators of domestic violence unrelated to dowry demands have 
escaped prosecution, contributing to a pervasive societal attitude tolerant of other 
forms of violence against women. A recent bill passed by India’s parliament, however, 
aims to change this attitude. . . . The bill is unique in its comprehensive categorization 
of domestic violence, which represents a departure from previous, narrower 
characterizations of domestic violence.”). 
132. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, 
INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12, ch. 4, § 14(1) (providing that a judge may mandate a 
domestic violence offender to attend counseling either alone or with his partner). 
133. See id. 
134. See id.; see also Indira Jaising, Reconsidered: Dangerous Bill: Severe and Nationwide 
Criticism of the Govt’s Domestic Violence Bill Resulted in it Being Reconsidered, INDIA 
TOGETHER (Nov. 2002), http://www.indiatogether.org/women/violence/domvol
bill.htm (“Moreover, Section 11 contains a provision for the woman to undergo 
mandatory counselling with the abuser. This goes against all accepted principles of 
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of this stipulation and other provisions within the law are limited 
by a lack of public awareness and inadequate funding.135 
The inclusion of batterer intervention programs in the 
recently enacted domestic violence legislation in Brazil and 
India is reflective of the influence of the recommendations of 
the UN and COE discussed earlier in Part I.C.1–2. In evaluating 
these recommendations, it is important to understand how they 
have fared in countries that have been publicly engaged with 
such policies for decades. Part I.D.1–2 offered this comparison 
by describing the use of batterer interventions in the United 
States and England. The existing and ongoing controversy 
regarding the use of these programs and the evaluation of the 
appropriateness of the recommendations of the UN and COE 
continues in Parts II and III. 
II. THE DEBATE OVER BATTERER INTERVENTION 
PROGRAMS 
Despite the ratification of domestic violence legislation that 
includes the use of batterer intervention programs, such 
programs remain controversial in domestic violence advocacy 
circles. This Part discusses the conflicting perceptions of 
batterer intervention programs by analyzing the arguments 
made by the programs’ proponents and opponents in Sections A 
and B, respectively. Section C addresses whether batterer 
intervention programs should be part of a top-down policy 
approach to domestic violence sentencing. 
A. The Argument for Batterer Intervention Programs 
Supporters of batterer intervention programs often 
optimize and support a comprehensive community response to 
domestic violence. This approach utilizes the best efforts of 
judges, police officers, social workers, prosecutors, children, and 
                                                                                                                            
counselling. Mandatory counselling is one method of correcting abusive behaviour. It 
is ridiculous to enable the magistrate to insist on ‘mandatory’ counselling of the 
innocent party.”). 
135. See Kavita Chowdhury, Domestic Violence Act Not Backed Up, INDIA TODAY (Apr. 
4, 2010), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/91165/India/Domestic+Violence+
Act+lacks+funds.html (“Three years into its enactment, the Protection of Women from 
Domestic Violence Act is hampered by limited awareness and inadequate budgets.”).  
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batterers in domestic violence sentencing.136 Success in 
reforming offender behavior has proven more frequent when 
abusers participate in batterer intervention programs operating 
in conjunction with a comprehensive community response and 
strict judicial monitoring.137 For example, in Quincy, 
Massachusetts, the coordinated community response utilized by 
the District Court Domestic Abuse Program has seen a drastic 
reduction in domestic violence homicides compared with other 
jurisdictions in Massachusetts that simultaneously suffered 
increases.138 Other researchers have also concluded that 
batterers’ programs do have a positive, albeit modest, impact on 
domestic violence prevention.139 
                                                                                                                            
136. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1320 (“This suggests that batterer intervention 
programs may be more effective when coordinated with other community interventions 
and further emphasizes the need for a coordinated community response.”); see also 
Report on Domestic Violence: A Commitment to Action, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 377 (1993) 
(defending the use of batterer intervention programs when used in the context of 
coordinated community responses to domestic violence). 
137. See Dekki, supra note 50, at 583–84 n.143 (“It has been proven that the best 
way to combat domestic violence is through a Coordinated Community Response, 
which stresses the severity of the problem.”); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 1319–20 
(“One study documented that of those batterers under court supervision, the treated 
batterers showed a decrease in psychological abuse, as opposed to physical abuse, when 
compared with untreated batterers. . . . Some suggest that one reason for the initial 
success of court-mandated counseling may relate to the additional influence of the 
court intervention itself. This suggests that batterer intervention programs may be 
more effective when coordinated with other community interventions and further 
emphasizes the need for a coordinated community response.”). 
138. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1318 (“The number of domestic violence 
homicides in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had increased from one woman 
killed every twenty-two days in 1986 to one woman killed every four days during the 
early part of 1995. However, in the area served by the Quincy District Court Domestic 
Abuse Program, there has been only one homicide resulting from domestic violence in 
16 years. This accomplishment is due in large part to the unification of the efforts of 
everyone from judges, police officers, and prosecutors to social service agencies serving 
victims, batterers, and children. It is this coordinated community response that has 
made the Quincy District Court program such a success.”); see also Elena Salzman, 
Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal 
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 338–39, n.57 (1994) 
(analyzing the Quincy program and its model for success). 
139. See, e.g., Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Special Series: Problem Solving Courts and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather but Nonetheless Essential) Facts, 
Ma’am: What We Know and Don’t Know about Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1027 (2003) (describing moderate positive effects of batterer intervention 
programs on violence prevention); Robert C. Davis & Bruce G. Taylor, Does Batter 
Treatment Reduce Violence? A Synthesis of the Literature, in WOMEN & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 69, 
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While proponents are encouraged by positive results in 
jurisdictions like Quincy, Massachusetts, they also recognize that 
contradictory studies exist.140 Faced with conflicting evidence, 
some advocates, including the National Academy of Sciences, 
conclude that the urgency and magnitude of domestic violence 
has prompted policy makers and the like to act without scientific 
support.141 These supporters view batterer intervention 
programs as being the only reform-minded approach for 
domestic violence offenders.142 Specifically, they argue that there 
is no adequate alternative.143 The rationale underlying this belief 
is that if an offender is punished without participation in an 
intervention program, he will be just as likely to reoffend 
without having learned any reformed behavior.144 
Yet another argument for batterer intervention programs is 
that in many situations it is the sentence most desired by the 
victim.145 Batterer intervention program advocates assert that if a 
                                                                                                                            
72, 82–83 (Lynette Feder ed., 1999) (reporting on studies that have exhibited positive 
results regarding the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs). 
140. See, e.g., Rizza, supra note 52, at 131 (recognizing inconsistent and 
contradictory studies regarding the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs); 
Tsai, supra note 31, at 1318–19 (reflecting on the conflicting studies and reports on the 
efficacy of batterer intervention programs). 
141. See Rizza, supra note 52, at 126 (“The National Academy of Science correctly 
concludes that the urgency and magnitude of domestic violence has encouraged policy 
makers, service providers, and advocates to act without scientific support.”); Lynette 
Feder & David B. Wilson, A Meta-Analytic Review of Court-Mandated Batterer Intervention 
Programs: Can Courts Affect Abusers’ Behavior?, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 239, 
257–58 (2005) (citing to the findings of the National Academy of Sciences on the 
importance of batterer intervention programs despite the lack of sound scientific 
evidence regarding their effectiveness). 
142. See Dekki, supra note 50, at 564–65 (“A clear reason to support Batterer 
Intervention Programs, particularly court-mandated programs, is that there are 
presently no adequate alternatives.”); see also Rizza, supra note 52, at 145 (“In most 
jurisdictions in the United States, crimes of violence against a family member are 
punishable by incarceration, fines, mandatory batterer treatment, and negative social 
stigma. Effective offender treatment remains an enigma. As Duluth advocates 
recognized in the 1980s, incarceration alone fails to change behavior, especially 
considering that the roots of domestic violence lie deep in our patriarchal social 
structure.”). 
143. See supra note 142 (rephrasing that proponents believe that there are no 
adequate alternatives to batterer intervention programs). 
144. See supra note 142 (describing why batterer intervention programs are 
irreplaceable in a comprehensive and effective response to domestic violence). 
145. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1310–11 (“However, the system must also take into 
account . . . the wishes of its victims.”); see also Report on Domestic Violence: A Commitment 
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court imposes harsh penalties and aggressive prosecution 
policies against a victim’s wishes, it is using paternalism to 
further disempower victims.146 
B. The Argument Against Batterer Intervention Programs 
The central argument of opponents of batterer 
intervention programs is simply that these programs are 
ineffective. Over thirty-five studies have been conducted in the 
United States regarding the effectiveness of batterer 
intervention programs, and the only consensus to emerge from 
these studies is that there is no consensus at all.147 A report 
conducted by the National Institute of Justice in 2003 reviewed 
the results from studies that evaluated the effectiveness of 
batterer intervention programs and concluded that “[t]he stakes 
for women’s safety are simply too high to rely heavily on the use 
of [batterer intervention programs] without stronger empirical 
evidence that they work.”148 
Opponents further stress that the continued endorsement 
of batterer intervention programs is a misguided policy that 
                                                                                                                            
to Action, supra note 136, at 338–39 (discussing the incorporation of victim’s wishes into 
the sentencing formula in domestic violence cases).  
146. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1311 (“[A]ggressive prosecution . . . may ultimately 
disempower victims by taking away their freedom of choice and forcing prosecution 
when they may ultimately benefit more from a different course of action.”); see also 
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849–50 (1996) (noting that “tensions between state 
accountability and victim autonomy” exist). 
147. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 2 (“More than 35 
BIP evaluations have been published. . . . The results, however, remain inconclusive 
because of methodological flaws in these evaluations.”); see also Jennifer P. Maxwell, 
Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and 
Mediators, 37 FAM. & COUNCIL. CTS. REV. 335, 343 (1999) (“Studies of batterers’ 
intervention programs have consistently found that the effectiveness of these programs 
is difficult to determine, with many of the intervention programs themselves claiming 
little success.”); MINISTRY OF JUST., WHAT WORKS WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
OFFENDERS?, supra note 14 (explaining that most studies conducted on batterer 
intervention programs have been done in the United States).  
148. See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 26 (finding that the 
inconsistency of research studies on the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs 
leads to the conclusion that for the sake of victim safety, batterer intervention programs 
should not be relied upon); see also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 87, at 343 (quoting 
the National Institute of Justice’s findings regarding victim safety and the 
indeterminable nature of studies on batterer intervention program success). 
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misappropriates funds toward experimentation.149 These 
skeptics contend that programs in the criminal justice system 
should not receive governmental support or funding without 
assurances that the promised results can, and will, be 
delivered.150 In communities with limited resources and funding, 
opponents argue that these funds could be better directed 
towards proven effective measures like victims’ services and 
community education programs.151 
Critics further question whether government support for 
batterer intervention programs is responsible governance.152 
They cite to the risks associated with the potential failure of such 
programs.153 These risks include: potential threats to victim 
safety, the message being sent to offenders that their violent 
actions will incur no punishment, and perceived discrimination 
                                                                                                                            
149. See Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of 
Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57, 81 
(2009) (“New state courts, like new medications, should not receive federal support or 
approval without proper study, testing, and vetting, as well as delivery of promised 
results.”); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 1314 (“A third source of controversy involves 
the use of valuable domestic violence resources on services for perpetrators. Many 
battered women’s advocates object to spending money on long-term interventions for 
batterers when doing so diverts limited funds away from services for battered 
women.”). 
150. See Quinn, supra note 149, at 81–82 (arguing that federal support should not 
be given to solutions still in the experimental stage without evidence supporting their 
purported results); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 1314 (explaining the opposition of 
many domestic violence advocates to using limited domestic violence funding for 
perpetrators instead of victims). 
151. See OPDV Bulletin: Programs for Men Who Batter: What Have We Learned?, N.Y. 
STATE OFF. PREVENTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE [OPDV], http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/
public_awareness/bulletins/fall2000/batterers.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) 
[hereinafter OPDV] (purporting that funding for domestic violence should be directed 
toward victims services or alternatively community education programs, not batterer 
intervention programs); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 1314 (noting that critics of 
batterer intervention programs are opposed to domestic violence funding being 
diverted away from victims to support batterer programs). 
152. See OPDV, supra note 151 (criticizing batterer intervention programs as 
putting victim safety in danger, for the sake of experimentation); see also HEALEY, 
SMITH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 10 (quoting Andrew Kleing, Chief Probation 
Officer, Quincy, Massachusetts: “Batterer intervention is a public safety program, not 
treatment; you must keep the focus on victim safety. Otherwise, the criminal justice 
system is only offering the batterer a safe haven to escape the consequences of his 
offense.”). See generally Robbins, supra note 93 (arguing that the US Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause mandates that domestic violence be treated by the criminal 
justice system in the same way as violence committed by strangers). 
153. See, e.g., OPDV, supra note 151; HEALEY, SMITH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 25, 
at 10. 
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toward domestic violence victims whose abusers ultimately 
receive lesser sentences than victims who are subject to violence 
from strangers.154 The Office for the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence in New York has condemned batterer intervention 
programs stating that the “trial and error” of these programs has 
the potential to falter at the expense of victim safety.155 These 
advocates argue that these programs reinforce the notion that 
domestic violence is less serious than other violent offenses, and 
can be “fixed” outside of the criminal justice system.156 It is 
further contended that the wrong message is being sent to 
communities about the seriousness of domestic violence when 
offenders are given suspended sentences with mandated 
attendance in a batterer treatment program for crimes that in 
other circumstances would have warranted jail time.157 
With regard to batterer treatment programs that utilize 
couples counseling, as in India, criticism has been particularly 
strong.158 The National Institute of Justice explained: “Family 
systems interventions . . . [may] endanger the victim if not 
performed conscientiously.”159 The perceived threat of couples 
counseling in the eyes of these critics stems from the belief that 
                                                                                                                            
154. See OPDV, supra note 151; see also HEALEY, SMITH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 
25, at 10 (detailing the risks that follow the failure of batterer intervention programs). 
155. See OPDV, supra note 151 (advocating against batterer intervention programs 
because they endanger victim safety for “trial and error”); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 
1310 (“In addition to this problem of conflicting goals, critics argue that despite 
innovative domestic violence advances, improper enforcement of new policies may 
negate their intended effect.”). 
156. See OPDV, supra note 151 (alleging that batterer intervention programs 
undermine efforts to move society away from the notion that domestic violence is a less 
serious crime); see also Tsai, supra note 31, at 1311 (“This approach may send a message 
that domestic violence cases are not considered to be serious, because defendants can 
avoid criminal punishment by attending counseling programs.”). 
157. See Tsai, supra note 31, at 1311 (noting that “[t]his approach may send a 
message that domestic violence cases are not considered to be serious, because 
defendants can avoid criminal punishment by attending counseling programs.”); see 
also FAGAN, supra note 31, at 39 (noting that sentencing options in domestic violence 
cases must be handled very delicately so as not to undermine the ability of legal 
institutions to protect against violence). 
158. See Maxwell, supra note 147, at 345 (noting criticism of batterer intervention 
programs designed as couples counseling); see also infra Part I.D.4 (regarding the 
counseling provision in India’s domestic violence law, and criticism of that provision).  
159. Maxwell, supra note 147, at 344 (quoting the National Institute of Justice on 
the troublesome aspects of batterer intervention programs that take the form of 
couples counseling). 
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any successful counseling will be based on a foundation of equal 
power between the participants.160 In abusive relationships, 
however, the balance of power between the victim and the 
perpetrator is inherently unequal as the victim often possesses a 
fear of physical violence, coercive attacks, and the perception 
that her participation will result in retaliation by the abuser.161 
Thus, this form of treatment is only considered viable once 
victims have become equally empowered.162 
Additionally, opponents argue that alternatives exist that 
would serve the same purpose more successfully, such as 
increased judicial monitoring and offender accountability 
measures, which could include the offender routinely reporting 
to the court for status updates.163 The New York Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence has stated, “[a] batterers 
program is not necessary to achieve an effective, coordinated 
response to domestic violence.”164 Instead, based on the Offices’ 
years of experiences, it concludes that offender accountability is 
                                                                                                                            
160. See Marriage/Couples Counseling v. Men’s BIP, CRISIS CONNECTION, 
http://www.crisisconnectioninc.org/ pdf/ marriage_counseling.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 
2012); see also Policy Statement on Couples Counseling & Anger Management of Domestic 
Violence Cases, N.Y. STATE OFF. PREVENTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://opdv.state.ny.us/ public_awareness/ bulletins/ fall2003/ legalcorner.html (last 
visited, Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Couples Counseling & Anger Management]. 
161. See Marriage/Couples Counseling v. Men’s BIP, supra note 160; Couples 
Counseling & Anger Management, supra note 160 (“People who are being either hit, 
intimated or controlled through threats or other coercive means by their partners are 
not free to engage in open dialogue.”). 
162. See Marriage/Couples Counseling v. Men’s BIP, supra note 160; Couples 
Counseling & Anger Management, supra note 160. 
163. See Berman & Gulick, supra note 139, at 1043 (“Evidence suggests that 
rigorous court monitoring may have more of an effect on recidivism than do batterer 
reeducation programs.”); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., DOES BATTERER TREATMENT 
REDUCE VIOLENCE? A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN BROOKLYN (2000) (studying the 
comparative success of offenders assigned to community service with those linked to 
batterers’ intervention and finding that those offenders least likely to reoffend were 
those under court supervision for the longest period of time). 
164. See OPDV, supra note 151 (noting that batterers programs are not necessary 
to elicit an effective, coordinated response to domestic violence); see also LABRIOLA ET 
AL., supra note 52, at viii (“Indeed, the main findings from our randomized trial are 
consistent with other recent trials, of which none found that mandating offenders to a 
batterer program for groups for men produced lower rates of re-abuse.”). 
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best achieved through effective probation supervision and 
criminal justice sanctions.165 
C. A Top-Down Approach to Domestic Violence Sentencing Policy 
Both international and national governing forces have 
played a dominant role in promulgating human rights and the 
movement against domestic violence.166 For example, in Brazil 
and India international pressure was a motivating factor behind 
the passage of key domestic violence legislation.167 On the other 
hand, there are a number of complicating and problematic 
issues that arise when an international or national body makes 
specific, detailed policy recommendations for localities to 
implement.168 
One such issue is that localities claim no stake in the success 
of these policies because they played no part in their creation.169 
                                                                                                                            
165. See OPDV, supra note 151; see also Berman & Gulick, supra note 139, at 1043 
(“Evidence suggests that rigorous court monitoring may have more of an effect on 
recidivism than do batterer reeducation programs.”). 
166. See Roure, supra note 68, at 65 (noting that “[i]nternational human rights 
laws and principles can provide an important source of inspiration and a rallying point 
for social change. The domestic violence reform in Brazil illustrates this fact”); see also 
The International Legal Framework, supra note 59 (discussing the role that the 
international community and organizations have played in instigating human rights 
development throughout the world). 
167. See supra notes 59, 117–18, and 126–28 (citing the influence that 
international organizations had on the instigation of change in domestic violence 
policy in Brazil and India). 
168. Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of Problem-Solving Justice: An 
International Perspective, 10 RRGC 1, 19 (2010) (“There is an inherent tension between 
local and central government ownership of problem-solving justice reform. For 
example, when central government imposes formal targets on local criminal justice 
agencies.”); see OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, WORKING TOGETHER TO CUT 
CRIME AND DELIVER JUSTICE: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 2008–2011, 2007, Cm. 7247, 31–36 
(U.K.), available at http://www.criminalsolicitor.net/forum/uploads/shrek/
Glink/2007-11-15_150844_1_Strategic_Plan_All.pdf (providing evidence of the 
challenges between coordinating local and national efforts in problem solving justice). 
Berman and Fox conducted individual interviews with players in the criminal justice 
system in England to gather information for this paper. See Berman & Fox, supra note 
168. 
169. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 18–19 (stating that local buy in is a 
serious challenge to implementation of problem solving justice in England and Wales); 
see also Problem-Solving Justice in the United States: Common Principles, CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Problem_Solving_
Justice_in_the_US.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION] (“Citizens and neighborhood groups have an important role to play in 
helping the justice system identify, prioritize, and solve local problems.”). 
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The need for local investment in policy changes to the criminal 
justice system has been especially emphasized by scholars and 
researchers in the field of problem-solving justice.170 Interviews 
conducted in England on the subject indicate that many 
practitioners feel that domestic violence reforms and other 
problem solving court issues are the “flavor of the month,” 
“forced upon them from above.”171 This attitude, compounded 
with natural tensions between local and central governments, 
has led to an “ownership” problem with reform.172 
Another issue with the top-down approach concerns 
funding.173 In communities with limited resources, it is arguably 
impractical for supranational and national bodies to 
recommend policy initiatives that are ultimately dependent on 
sustained and reliable local funding.174 Moreover, the difficulty 
                                                                                                                            
170. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 19 (evaluating challenges in 
implementing national policies for problem-solving justice without local involvement); 
see also CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra note 169, at 2 (noting the importance of local 
players in effectuating problem-solving court initiatives). Problem-solving justice refers 
to a development in the justice system of employing specialized courts to deal with 
cases that confront specific social issues who are not generally compatible with the 
traditional system of adversarial justice and punishment. See Problem Solving Courts and 
Other Court Innovation, CUTTING EDGE L., http://www.cuttingedgelaw.com/page/
problem-solving-courts-and-other-court-innovation (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). These 
specialized courts are focused on attempting to address the root of the problems 
brought before them in order to prevent future occurrences. See Problem Solving Courts 
and Other Court Innovation, supra. The most common kinds of problem-solving courts 
are drug courts and domestic violence courts. See Problem Solving Courts and Other Court 
Innovation, supra. 
171. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 19 (“For some ground-level 
practitioners, there is a feeling that problem-solving reform is the ‘flavor-of-the-month’ 
being forced upon them from above.”). 
172. See id. (“There is an inherent tension between local and central government 
ownership of problem-solving justice reform.”); see also CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, supra 
note 169, at 2 (highlighting the importance of the relationship between local and 
national players in effectuating problem-solving court initiatives). 
173. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 19–20 (“In a time of shrinking 
resources, it may be difficult to sustain the problem-solving initiatives already in place, 
let alone expand their use.”); see also Roure, supra note 68, at 94 (“Despite the 
increased resources, funding remains insufficient.”); David Barrett, Cash Crisis 
‘Undermining Sentencing,’ PRESS ASS’N NEWSFILE, Mar. 17, 2008, available at LEXIS 
(reporting the effects of insufficient funds and budgetary crises on domestic violence 
and other sentencing options); Chowdhury, supra note 135 (“Three years into its 
enactment, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is hampered by 
limited awareness and inadequate budgets.”). 
174. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 19–20 (noting that the Attorney 
General of England ruled out replicating a successful community justice center because 
of its expense); see also Roure, supra note 68, at 94 (“Despite the increased resources, 
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of generating the resources needed to support batterer 
intervention programs is further strained by these programs’ 
inability to produce substantive data illustrating their success.175 
The argument follows that, in order for a tax-paying public to 
have confidence and support in criminal justice programs, these 
programs ultimately have to produce results. 
Finally, another difficulty with top-down implementation of 
batterer intervention programs, as well as domestic violence 
sentencing policies generally, is that it reflects a “one size fits 
all” approach.176 In many jurisdictions batterer treatment 
programs are either statutorily mandated or practically utilized 
for almost every domestic violence offender, leaving little 
allowance for different family situations or diversity among 
offenders.177 This “one size fits all” approach fails to address 
some of the most common causes and effects of domestic 
                                                                                                                            
funding remains insufficient.”); Barrett, supra note 173 (reporting the effects of 
insufficient funds and budgetary crises on domestic violence and other sentencing 
options); Chowdhury, supra note 135 (“Three years into its enactment, the Protection 
of Women from Domestic Violence Act is hampered by limited awareness and 
inadequate budgets.”). 
175. See Berman & Fox, supra note 168, at 22 (arguing that substantive data 
proving success of criminal justice programs is necessary to retain public confidence 
and political support for funding); see also supra notes 147–49 (detailing studies whose 
results indicate either no success or an inability to determine the success of batterer 
intervention programs). 
176. See Jean Ferguson, Professional Discretion and the Use of Restorative Justice 
Programs in Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 3, 
4 (2009) (“The tendency of both mandatory arrest and prosecution policies and 
batterer’s treatment programs is to respond identically in all domestic violence 
situations.”); see also Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and The Home Term Part: A 
Second Look at the Nation’s First Criminal Domestic Violence Court, 41 AKRON L. REV. 733, 
761 (“[The] one-size-fits-all approach’ . . . seems to permeate today’s domestic violence 
courts and contemporary attempts to explain violence between intimates.”). For a 
more in depth discussion of the complications associated with adopting a uniform 
approach to the handling of domestic violence situations, see Joan B. Kelly & Michael 
P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and 
the Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM CT. REV. 476 (2008). Kelly and Johnson discuss 
differing forms of domestic violence and argue that tailored responses, which 
appropriately and uniquely address a particular kind of domestic violence, should be 
used by the criminal justice system. See generally Kelly & Johnson, supra.  
177. See Ferguson, supra note 176, at 4 (noting that, in California, all persons 
convicted of a crime of family violence are required to participate in a batterer 
intervention program); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097 (2011) (providing an 
example of a statute that mandates that all domestic violence offenders participate in a 
batterer treatment program). 
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violence, like substance abuse, by focusing solely on violence 
intervention.178 
III. THE LOCAL VOICE BEHIND SENTENCING POLICY 
MATTERS 
Domestic violence is undoubtedly a difficult issue for 
criminal justice systems throughout the world. Its widespread 
prevalence has compelled international and national 
governments to respond through legislation and policy 
initiatives.179 As noted, a number of these initiatives have 
recently included policy endorsements for the use of 
controversial batterer intervention programs.180 While these 
programs have been debated for a number of years on the local 
level, their invocation on the national and international level 
raises new controversy as to whether it is appropriate and sound 
policy for these bodies to advocate the use of such programs. 
This Note argues that it is irresponsible for international and 
governmental bodies to broadly endorse the use of batterer 
treatment programs in legislative recommendations to nations 
and localities. Instead, this Note proposes that the promulgation 
of batterer treatment programs in policy and practice should 
remain with the localities ultimately accountable for their 
success. 
A. Effectiveness of Batterer Intervention Programs 
Although only a relatively small percentage of domestic 
violence cases make their way to court, the judicial 
considerations in issuing a criminal sentence for abuse 
committed in an intimate or familial relationship are complex 
and serious.181 The judge must weigh the gravity of the harm 
posed by the offender, the wishes of the victim, the safety of the 
                                                                                                                            
178. See Ferguson, supra note 176, at 4 (recognizing that batterer treatment 
programs typically do not address substance abuse, which is often both a cause and 
effect of domestic violence). 
179. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
180. See supra Parts I.C.1–2. 
181. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (portraying the relatively small 
percentage of domestic violence cases that ultimately end up in court); see also supra 
note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the complex issues that are unique to 
domestic violence cases, which complicate sentencing of abusers). 
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victim, and the policy goals and best interests of the community 
and society at large, among other factors.182 In looking at the 
historical rise of batterer intervention programs, it is apparent 
that the use of such programs was originally intended to address 
these often contradicting factors.183 In practice, however, it is 
also clear that these programs have not been as successful as 
hoped.184 Despite the programs’ sporadic and small successes in 
some instances, most studies have failed to show that batterer 
intervention programs are effective.185 
Additionally, it is unfortunate that coordinated community 
responses to combat domestic violence require not only more 
funding but also more local investment and support.186 Given 
current economic circumstances, government funding in many 
countries has been limited for criminal justice programs.187 This 
funding shortage hinders the ability of many local jurisdictions 
to adequately implement their desired sentencing policies.188 In 
many developing countries where domestic violence legislation 
is just emerging, like Brazil and India, these funding concerns 
are very serious.189 
The outlook on batterer intervention programs, however, is 
not completely grim.190 Studies indicate that batterer 
intervention programs utilized as one part of a coordinated 
                                                                                                                            
182. See supra note 44 (discussing factors that often complicate the sentencing of a 
domestic violence abuser). 
183. See supra Part I.B (outlining the historical antecedents of the domestic 
violence movements and the rise of batterer intervention programs). 
184. See supra notes 1–16 and 147–50 and accompanying text (indicating that 
batterer intervention programs are ineffective and have been unsuccessful). 
185. See supra notes 136–41 and 147–50 and accompanying text (noting that while 
some programs have seen success, collectively there is no foundation to suggest that 
batterer intervention programs are effective). 
186. See supra Part II.C (explaining why problem-solving justice requires more 
local buy-in). 
187. See supra Part II.C (explaining why funding shortages limit the effect of 
problem solving justice); see also supra note 121 (discussing Brazil’s limited resources); 
supra note 135 (discussing obstacles to the full implementation of domestic violence 
law in India because of a lack of resources); supra notes 173–74 (discussing the funding 
limitations on problem-solving justice). 
188. See supra note 174 (detailing the impact of limited funding resources on the 
implementation of domestic violence measures). 
189. See supra notes 121 and 135 (noting financial constraints in Brazil and India 
on the enforcement of their new domestic violence laws). 
190. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (providing evidence of 
batterer treatment success). 
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community response have a greater likelihood of success.191 
Several jurisdictions that are financially capable of sustaining a 
coordinated community response have seen marked 
improvements in domestic violence rates as a result of this 
comprehensive approach.192 Despite these developments, it 
should be noted that some studies have indicated that increased 
judicial monitoring, and not batterer intervention programs, are 
what really influence recidivism rates in coordinated 
responses.193 Nevertheless, in a community or world with 
unlimited resources, the relatively small success rate in reducing 
domestic violence would justify the use of batterer intervention 
programs.194 Any amount of victims spared violence would be 
better than none at all.195 Therefore, batterer intervention 
programs, when used as part of a fully-funded, fully-operational 
coordinated community response, are important and useful. 
Absent those conditions, however, these programs are 
potentially dangerous to victim safety and should not be used.196 
B. The Role of International and National Domestic Violence 
Legislation and Policy on Batterer Intervention Programs 
The secondary question in this analysis is whether 
international and national governments should advocate for 
these programs when ultimately they are not responsible for 
their implementation. In short, this Note concludes that the 
answer is no. 
                                                                                                                            
191. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (discussing the increased 
success with coordinated community response approaches to domestic violence 
sentencing). 
192. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (citing to jurisdictions like 
Quincy, Massachusetts, as an illustration of increased rates of success of fully-funded 
coordinated community responses to domestic violence). 
193. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (contrasting opinions as to 
why coordinated community responses have been successful, giving credit to increased 
judicial monitoring and not batterer intervention programs). 
194. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (citing to the National Academy of 
Sciences, which has stated that the severity of domestic violence warrants 
unscientifically proven measures). 
195. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (referring to the small but 
important relative success of batterer intervention programs). 
196. See supra note 152 (describing risks associated with the failure of batterer 
intervention programs). 
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On the one hand, international and national governmental 
bodies have been incredibly influential in the development of 
the movement against domestic violence.197 Their influence and 
recommendations have led to local and national legislation and 
initiatives that have dramatically shifted the traditional legal 
framework for domestic violence.198 Along this vein, it is natural 
to suggest that these bodies should continue to pioneer 
legislative and policy recommendations to this end, including 
ones that endorse batterer intervention programs. After all, in 
the sample of international and national governmental bodies 
reviewed, almost all qualified their policy recommendations by 
explicitly noting that batterer intervention programs should be 
accompanied by heightened judicial scrutiny and monitoring.199 
In practice, however, despite these technical qualifications, 
heightened judicial scrutiny and court monitoring in many 
jurisdictions has not been fully or even adequately realized.200 
Either because of a lack of funding and resources or because the 
law or local policy only partially internalized the national or 
international policy directives, batterer intervention programs 
are being replicated and run ineffectively and dangerously.201 
Well-intended legislative suggestions by international bodies and 
well-purposed national laws have thus inadvertently given rise to 
sentencing that is reckless and may actually exacerbate the 
problem of domestic violence.202 Brazil and India, two countries 
that have only recently enacted comprehensive domestic 
                                                                                                                            
197. See supra Part I.D (detailing international and national domestic violence 
legislation); see also supra notes 117–19 (discussing the impact of CEDAW on Brazil’s 
passage of the Maria da Penha law); supra notes 126–27 (detailing the role of the 
international community in the movement to end domestic violence in India). 
198. See supra notes 117–19 and 126–27 (providing the changes of law in Brazil 
and India as two examples of the influence of the international community on 
domestic violence legislation).  
199. See supra notes 59–63 and 74–76 (describing the policy recommendations of 
the UN and COE, including qualifying statements encouraging judicial scrutiny and 
close monitoring of offenders). 
200. See supra notes 60–61 and 74–76 and accompanying text (citing the 
qualification language included in international policy recommendations for batterer 
intervention programs). 
201. See supra Part II.B–C; see also supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text (noting 
the dangerous outcomes of ineffective implementation of batterer intervention 
programs). 
202. See supra notes 60–61 and 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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violence legislation, are perfect illustrations of this problem.203 
Both countries drafted legislation with the policy 
recommendations of the UN and following models of countries 
like England and the United States, and both included batterer 
intervention programs as part of their domestic violence 
framework.204 They did this despite the financial and structural 
limitations facing their governments for combating domestic 
violence.205 International and national governmental bodies 
should refrain from dictating or advocating such policy for this 
exact reason. The safety of victims needs to be a more 
thoughtful priority. 
Despite the assertion that national and international 
governments should not make any legislative recommendations 
for domestic violence, it is crucial to note that these bodies do 
have an important and significant role to play in the fight 
against domestic violence.206 In terms of providing funding and 
resources, guiding criminal penalties, conducting research and 
studies, and coordinating interstate and cross-border programs, 
national and international bodies serve a unique and critical 
role.207 However, given the inconclusive and controversial nature 
of batterer intervention programs, as well as their potential to 
undermine victim safety while simultaneously encouraging 
harmful perceptions of domestic violence, supranational and 
national bodies should be overly cautious and refrain from 
suggesting these particular programs.208 
Instead of a top-down approach, local communities that are 
ultimately responsible for implementing sentencing options 
should individually consider whether they are in fact capable 
and equipped to utilize these programs effectively. Without local 
                                                                                                                            
203. See supra Part I.D.3–4 (noting the fairly recent enactment of domestic 
violence legislation in Brazil and India). 
204. See supra Part I.D.3–4 (describing the influence of the UN and other 
governments on the domestic violence legislation enacted in Brazil and India). 
205. See supra notes 121, 135, 173–74 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra Part I.D and notes 117–19, 126–27 (reiterating the significance of 
the international community on the movement to end domestic violence). 
207. See supra Part I.D and notes 117–19, 126–27 (discussing the positive roles that 
international and national policies have played in the movement to end domestic 
violence). 
208. See supra Part II.A–C (outlining the criticisms and inconclusive results of 
studies measuring the effectiveness of batterer treatment programs). 
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commitment to fund and enforce these programs, they cannot 
and will not be successful. 
This conclusion is subject to amendment in the future 
should new research indicate that batterer treatment programs 
have increased in their effectiveness. Until that point, however, 
victim safety must be the first priority of local, national, and 
supranational bodies. Idealistic and experimental sentencing 
policies espoused from afar should be avoided. Instead, 
countries newly embracing domestic violence legislation should 
prioritize victim safety over batterer rehabilitation. Their 
legislation should be tailored to the capabilities and social 
realities of their countries and with the incorporation of local 
participation. This focus should continue until the individual 
society and governments have successfully implemented fully-
functional and fully-funded coordinated community responses. 
CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence presents unique challenges to criminal 
justice systems and governmental bodies seeking to remedy its 
severe and pervasive consequences worldwide. In an attempt to 
address the severity of domestic violence, international and 
national governmental bodies have increasingly adopted 
sentencing policies that endorse the use of controversial 
batterer intervention programs. In many cases, these programs 
provide an alternative to a harsher sentence, taking into the 
sentencing process the considerations of offender rehabilitation 
and victims’ wishes. Some studies have indicated that these 
programs are ineffective and potentially dangerous because 
their leniency toward offenders risks victim safety. Furthermore, 
the theoretical purity of these policies has been undermined in 
translation from international and national policy to local 
implementation, largely as a result of funding and 
intergovernmental coordination problems. Taking these factors 
into consideration, national and international bodies should not 
issue overly broad endorsements of batterer intervention 
programs. Rather, because successful batterer intervention 
programs are contingent on the effectiveness of local follow-
through and funding, their implementation and perpetuation, 
as a policy, should be limited only to localities that have the 
capacity and capabilities to utilize them properly. 
